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A MODIFIED THEORY OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS: THE CASE OF ARISING-UNDER
JURISDICTION
Simona Grossi*
To my Civil Procedure Team 2012-2013
Abstract: This Article examines and evaluates the legal process method as a perspective
from which to assess the law of federal courts. It then offers a modified approach to legal
process that encompasses the full range of considerations that ought to inform modern
judicial decision-making in this context. With that modified approach in mind, the article
describes and critiques the Supreme Court’s statutory arising-under jurisprudence, both as
originally developed and as currently practiced. The article shows that while the Court’s
early “arising-under” jurisprudence was founded on durable principles and on the reasoned
application of those principles, more recent decisions by the Court have strayed from that
approach in service of a more mechanical jurisprudence. This approach seems to be premised
more on case-management concerns than on the congressionally endorsed value of providing
a federal forum for the interpretation and application of federal law. The article ends by
examining the Court’s decision in Gunn v. Minton. As the article explains, Gunn offered the
Court an opportunity to redirect the arising-under analysis back toward a perspective that
would more closely reflect the legitimate and enduring principles of federal question
jurisdiction. The Court, however, missed that opportunity and instead endorsed a mechanical,
four-part test as a substitute for reasoned analysis.
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INTRODUCTION
On February 20, 2013, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Gunn v. Minton. 1 There the Court revisited the scope of the federal
courts’ statutory “arising-under” jurisdiction in the context of a legal
malpractice suit premised on alleged attorney errors committed in a prior
patent litigation. 2 The significance of the decision transcends the specific
context in which it arose. Although Gunn involved patent law arisingunder jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1338, 3 that jurisdictional standard is
interpreted in precisely the same manner as the similarly worded § 1331
standard. 4 Hence, the decision in Gunn applies to a full range of federal
question cases in which a federal issue is embedded in a state-law claim.
In addition, and of equal importance, an assessment of Gunn and the law
of arising-under jurisdiction provides an opportunity to revisit and
reexamine the theoretical foundation of the law of federal courts. 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
Id. at 1062–63.
Id. at 1062.
Id. at 1064.
See Simona Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens Reconsidered, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming
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The Gunn opinion was highly anticipated by the legal community
because three decades of prior decisions by the Court had generated
considerable confusion as to the scope of arising-under jurisdiction. This
was particularly so in cases where the jurisdictionally relevant federal
ingredient was embedded in a state law claim—so called “federal
ingredient” cases. Some commentators hoped that the Court would adopt
the Holmes “creation test” 6 as the exclusive measure of arising-under
jurisdiction. 7 Others hoped for a clarification of the federal-ingredient
test. 8 Still others, like this author, hoped that the Court would redirect
the jurisdictional analysis back to the fundamental principles that once
animated the Court’s arising-under jurisprudence. 9
With the decision now in hand, everyone should be disappointed. The
Court did little to clarify the underlying doctrine and virtually nothing to
develop a coherent theoretical approach to jurisdictional questions. As I
will show, Gunn runs afoul of foundational theoretical principles at the
heart of the law of federal courts 10 and retains the Court’s misdirected
jurisdictional focus on an untenable distinction between what constitutes
a cause of action and what constitutes an enforceable right.
The specific jurisdictional issue in Gunn focused on what had come to
be known as the third and fourth prongs of the “Grable test,” 11 a fourpart test 12 designed to measure the scope of federal-ingredient
jurisdiction. Thus, the critical questions in Gunn were whether the
federal ingredient embedded in the plaintiff’s state-law claim was
substantial 13—the third prong—and whether the exercise of jurisdiction
over that claim would upset the congressionally mandated balance
between federal and state courts 14—the fourth prong. Lower courts
considering Grable’s four-part test had been struggling with the
interpretation and application of both of these prongs. Some had adopted
2014); Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit, 47 AKRON L.
REV. (forthcoming 2014).
6. See Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
7. Amicus Curiae Brief of Law Professors in Support of Petitioners at 1–2, 25, Gunn v. Minton,
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No. 11-1118).
8. See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Clarity & Clarification: Grable Federal Questions in the
Eyes of Their Beholders, 91 NEB. L. REV. 387, 388–89, 451–52 (2012).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 137–145.
10. See, e.g., Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1 (1959).
11. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
12. Id. at 314.
13. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1066–69 (2013).
14. Id. at 1068–69.
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detailed and highly technical doctrinal tests that led to counterintuitive
results where jurisdiction was denied over concededly “significant”
federal questions. 15 Others had adopted a more conceptual approach,
seemingly designed to apply the Grable test and, at the same time, avoid
that test’s obvious strictures. 16 Some lower courts actually confessed that
the jurisdictional determination was subjective and speculative and that,
under similar circumstances, different judges might reach different
conclusions. 17 While the Gunn Court did address the third and fourth
prongs of the Grable test, it did little other than endorse its previous
iterations of those elements, providing neither a defense for them nor a
principled method through which they might be applied in the future.
Thus, much of the confusion over federal jurisdictional standards that
preceded Gunn remains unresolved, and will remain so until the Court
adopts a principled, theoretically grounded approach to federal question
jurisdiction.
In Part I.A, I revisit and critique the philosophy of the legal process
school as applicable to the specific context of federal courts, and I offer
a modified approach to the school’s foundational method. In Part I.B, I
identify the core principles at the heart of arising-under jurisdiction and
suggest an analytical model that is premised on those principles and
capable of yielding predictable, nonsubjective conclusions. In Part II, I
offer Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Gully v. First National Bank 18 as an
exemplar of the theoretical and analytical model developed in Part I. Part
III examines more recent arising-under cases and shows that, beginning
in the 1980s, Gully’s approach to jurisdiction was abandoned and
replaced by a maze of increasingly complex doctrinal tests that are
inconsistent with the fundamental principles that animated Gully. Part IV
presents a case study of Gunn v. Minton, 19 describing the basic
controversy and the lower courts’ decisions. In Part V, I offer a Gullybased solution to the arising-under issue in Gunn, and in Part VI, I
present and critique the Supreme Court’s resolution of the same case.
Finally, in Part VII, I offer concluding remarks regarding the future
direction of federal question jurisdiction.

15. See, e.g., Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1031 (2008).
16. See, e.g., Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
17. E.g., Mikulski, 501 F.3d at 561.
18. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
19. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
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TOWARD A THEORY OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Gunn offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to return to Gully’s
principled approach or, at the very least, to provide a comprehensible
map that would assist lower federal courts in navigating the current
doctrinal maze. The Court, regrettably, missed that opportunity. Instead,
the Court endorsed a formulaic approach that disserves well-established
principles of jurisdiction and does little to allay the confusion.
Regrettably, this test also invites results inconsistent with the
congressionally mandated goal of providing a federal forum for the
interpretation and application of federal law.
In the early twentieth century, Roscoe Pound lamented what he saw
as an increasing reliance on “mechanical” jurisprudence, a form of
judicial decision-making that proceeds through structured formulas and
uses conceptions as ultimate solutions rather than premises from which
to reason. 20 As Pound saw it, this type of jurisprudence offers narrow
rules that confine judicial discretion, leading judges to try to fit the case
to the rule rather than the rule to the case. 21
It is true that the common law method proceeds through case law, and
judicial opinions give contour and content to the applied principles and
rules. This is, indeed, the beauty and strength of the common law
system. However, in articulating and applying principles and rules,
judges should not fail to link the resulting doctrines and formulas to the
underlying principles and ideas from which those doctrines and formulas
are derived. 22 When they fail to do so, their “mechanical” jurisprudence
disserves the ends of justice.
Over a century ago, Pound sensed that the common law method was
increasingly exposed to the risks of mechanical jurisprudence, and thus
encouraged legal thinkers to revisit the relevant conceptions at the heart
of legal doctrine and thereby lay a sure foundation for legal analysis. 23
Thus, in an effort to unearth the principles that originally guided the
arising-under jurisdictional analysis, I turn to the theory of federal courts
as developed by the legal process school and suggest a model that might
return the current jurisprudence to a method of legal analysis that is
more faithful to the underlying arising-under principles and conceptions.

20.
21.
22.
23.

Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 620–21 (1908).
Roscoe Pound, Courts and Legislation, 7 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 361, 365 (1913).
Pound, supra note 20, at 622–23.
Id.
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Legal Process and Beyond

In an article written in 1994, Richard Fallon lamented a former
teacher’s observation that the study of federal courts had become an
“intellectual backwater.” 24 Fallon mounted a hearty defense to this
charge, and in so doing endorsed the continuing vitality of the legal
process school, from which the scholarly discipline of “Federal Courts”
emerged in the 1950s. 25 Despite this endorsement, Fallon noted that
legal process theory was born of a different era—post-Lochner and preWarren Court—and that modern circumstances and perceptions of the
law and of the role of federal courts might require some modification of
the animating principles and methodology. 26 He also called for future
federal courts scholarship that would, among other things, use the legal
process method to provide “critical analysis of cases and
doctrines, . . . proposals for law reform, . . . [and] efforts to identify
immanent values or purposes in light of which bodies of law might be
rationalized . . . .” 27
I agree with Fallon that legal process remains a worthy perspective
from which to examine the law of federal courts, and my article falls
within the scholarly agenda identified by him. But as Fallon and others
have recognized, legal process theory needs to be revitalized in light of
current jurisprudential developments and insights. 28 I have some
thoughts on the direction that a new theory of federal courts should take,
an approach that both borrows and diverges from the legal process
model.
B.

Classic Legal Process Theory

As is well known, the legal process school is directly traceable to the
work of Professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks. 29 And while the
influence of Hart and Sacks may have waned during the 1960s, their
24. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV.
953, 955 (1994).
25. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM (1953).
26. Fallon, supra note 24, at 959–60.
27. Id. at 977.
28. E.g., Philip P. Frickey, Getting from Joe to Gene (McCarthy): The Avoidance Canon, Legal
Process Theory, and Narrowing Statutory Interpretation in the Early Warren Court, 93 CALIF. L.
REV. 397 (2005); Robert Post, Theorizing Disagreement: Reconceiving the Relationship Between
Law and Politics, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1319 (2010).
29. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE
MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (tent. ed. 1958).
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basic ideas have been woven into the law of federal courts and have
remained persistently influential.
Professor Philip Frickey, a modern proponent of legal process,
described the Hart and Sacks theory as one that viewed all law,
“including the legislature’s role in statutory creation and the
administrative and judicial roles of statutory implementation and
application” as part of a “purposive endeavor designed to promote social
utility.” 30 Frickey noted that Hart and Sacks “assumed the legislature to
be made up of reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes
reasonably, and the judges interpreting statutes to be engaged in the
reasoned elaboration of those purposes as they could be made to fit
within the broader legal fabric.” 31 Thus, as Frickey saw Hart and Sacks’
view, “it was simply unacceptable to conclude that a statute lacked a
sensible purpose.” 32 Further, “unless it was impossible to conclude
otherwise, courts were to avoid the perspective of cynical observers who
might see only short-term political compromise rather than the embrace
of reasonable public policy purposes.” 33
More specifically, legal process theory can be seen as premised on
five interrelated elements: institutional settlement, anti-formalism, rule
of law, reasoned elaboration, and neutral principles. 34
1.

Institutional Settlement

The principle of institutional settlement posits that “decisions which
are the duly arrived at result of duly established procedures . . . ought to
be accepted as binding . . . .” 35 In this sense, institutional settlement
determines what the law “is.” That determination is legitimized by
reference to institutional allocations and institutionally-relevant
procedures and practices through which the determination is made.
Consistent with this principle, both legislatures and courts make law,
each within their own assigned sphere and each according to its own
established procedures. 36
30. Frickey, supra note 28, at 405.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Fallon, supra note 24, at 963–70. Fallon also identifies a sixth principle, structural
interpretation. Id. at 965. For reasons I will explain in the text, I treat that principle separately. See
infra text accompanying notes 73–81.
35. HART & SACKS, supra note 29, at 4.
36. Similarly, decades before Hart & Sacks, Benjamin Cardozo noted that judges must legislate
“interstitially,” where there are gaps in the law and, when they do so, their decisions are legitimate.
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In the words of Hart and Sacks, “these procedures and their
accompanying doctrines and practices will come to be seen as the most
significant and enduring part of the whole legal system, because they are
the matrix of everything else.” 37 One could say that from a legal process
perspective, the way things are done will determine, to a large extent,
what will and can be done. 38
2.

Anti-Formalism

The anti-formalism principle rejects rigid interpretations of the law
and posits instead that the law should be read in accord with evolving
circumstances and a pluralistic range of norms and interests. As Hart put
it, the law should be considered as “a continuous process of becoming. If
morality [for example] has a place in the ‘becoming,’ it has a place in
the ‘is.’” 39 The anti-formalism principle does not embrace legal realism,
but attempts to stake out a middle ground between realism and
positivism. 40 This approach to judicial decision-making is sometimes
described as “purposive.” 41 It also strongly suggests that the judicial
decision-making process consists of something more than merely finding
and applying the law. Indeed, it recognizes that judges do, indeed, make
law. 42

BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 69–70 (1921). The gaps in the
law where judges are required to “legislate” are essential to any legal system, and when a legislature
overplays its hand by imposing too much detail it runs against the spirit of the law.
37. HART & SACKS, supra note 29, at 6.
38. See id.
39. Henry M. Hart, Jr., Holmes’ Positivism—An Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 930 (1951)
(emphasis in original).
40. See Michael Wells, Behind the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process Tradition in
the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609, 619 (1991) (describing the distinction between
Legal Realism and the Legal Process school in terms of the limits imposed on the adjudictory role
by Legal Process).
41. Post, supra note 28, at 1332–36. Cardozo also thought that judges made law and, therefore,
operated within the “legislator’s wisdom.” CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 115. He also saw a
commonality in the methods used by judges and legislators: “The choice of methods, the
appraisement of values, must in the end be guided by like considerations for the one as for the other.
Each indeed is legislating within the limits of his competence.” Id. at 113.
42. Cardozo also believed law had to be conceived as something fluid and in a continuous process
of becoming in order to reflect and properly respond to human needs. In his words, “Nothing is
stable. Nothing absolute. All is fluid and changeable. There is an endless ‘becoming.’” CARDOZO,
supra note 36, at 28.
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Rule of Law

As Fallon observes, the rule of law “implies courts,” 43 and “requires
the availability of judicial remedies sufficient to vindicate fundamental
legal principles.” 44 Thus, although legal process recognizes the authority
of Congress to limit the jurisdiction of federal courts, the theory also
recognizes that “the power to regulate jurisdiction is actually a power to
regulate rights—rights to judicial process, whatever those are, and
substantive rights . . . .” 45 As such, the power to regulate jurisdiction is
subject to the rule of law principle that ensures the availability of courts
to enforce substantive rights. 46 As the foregoing makes clear, the rule of
law principle is neither the “law of rules” 47 nor an invitation to embrace
formalism.
4.

Reasoned Elaboration

The principle of reasoned elaboration means exactly what it suggests.
For a judicial decision to be legitimate, it must be supported by a
principled and logical explanation. It is this “role of reason” that
distinguishes a legitimate judicial judgment from a non-judicial political
choice. This distinction is, in essence, one between the “exercise of
reason” and an “an act of willfulness,” 48 with only the former being
properly characterized as judicial in nature.49
5.

Neutral Principles

Finally, the principle of consistency with the broader legal fabric,
which is closely related to the principle of reasoned elaboration, requires
that judicial decisions be premised on a legal principle that transcends
the immediate facts of the case, the particulars before the court. In his

43. Fallon, supra note 24, at 965.
44. Id.
45. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25, at 317.
46. Id. at 318.
47. Cf. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989).
48. Wechsler, supra note 10, at 11.
49. See id. at 31–35 (discussing the lack of reasoned analysis in the Equal Protection cases
decided by per curiam opinions after Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The idea
of reasoned elaboration was fully embraced by Cardozo, who saw both deductive and inductive
reasoning as essential to the process of judicial decision-making. It was also, in his view, important
to know “why and how the choice was made between one logic and another.” CARDOZO, supra note
36, at 41. He further observed, “[i]n law, as in every other branch of knowledge, the truths given by
induction tend to form the premises for new deductions.” Id. at 47.
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famous article, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 50
Herbert Wechsler explained that a “principled decision, in the sense I
have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in
the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend
any immediate result that is involved.” 51 This has become known as the
principle of “neutrality.” As I will explain below, I believe that the
adjective “durable” more accurately describes this principle.52
C.

Criticism of the Classic Theory

I accept most of the above postulates of the classic legal process
method, and particularly agree with the principles of reasoned
elaboration and neutrality as further explained below. An opinion that is
not consistent with these principles naturally leads to the suspicion that
the decision is not legitimate. 53 Of course, I recognize that when
deciding cases, judges will necessarily draw from their own personal
experience and opinions. 54 However, the principles of reasoned
elaboration and neutrality, sensibly applied, provide a framework
through which the legitimacy of a judicial decision can be measured
from a shared perspective of legal principles and logic that should
transcend the individual judge’s policy preferences in a particular case.
Moreover, these principles may help a judge check her personal instincts
in a way that will bring greater consistency and fairness to the law.
Professor Robert Post has criticized the principle of reasoned
elaboration to the extent that it is premised on the dichotomy between
“reason” and “will.” According to Post, this dichotomy is “far too crude
to capture the difference between law and politics. Reason exists in
politics, just as will exists in law.” 55
At a descriptive and empirical level, I agree with Post. Reason and
will play a role in both judicial and political decision-making. Legal
process theorists do not deny that. They do however insist that a judicial
decision be justified by reasoned elaboration, and recognize that there is
no such requirement that a political decision do so. In a sense, reasoned
50. Wechsler, supra note 10.
51. Id. at 19. Like Wechsler, Cardozo believed in the value of principles generated from the
transitory particulars through a process of “free decision” and “generalizations.” CARDOZO, supra
note 36, at 17–25.
52. See infra text accompanying notes 57–64.
53. Fallon, supra note 24, at 964, 969–70.
54. See Wells, supra note 40, at 642–43. But see Fallon, supra note 24, at 973 n.85 (responding to
Wells).
55. Post, supra note 28, at 1328.
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elaboration is an institutional requirement imposed on the judicial
branch, while majority rule is the institutional requirement of the
political process. In stating this disagreement with Post, I am not
drawing a bright line between the judicial and the political processes, but
only recognizing the requirement that a judicial decision be justified in
terms other than will, even if that judicial opinion is the product of a
five-to-four vote.
Post has also criticized the neutrality principle as being either trivial
(i.e., the magistrate must be neutral as between the parties), incoherent
(i.e., a “neutral principle” is an oxymoron), or an improper endorsement
of non-consequentialism (i.e., the notion that a judge should ignore the
consequences of her decisions). 56
I appreciate Post’s critique, but I do not fully agree with it. The
problem, as I see it, can be traced to Wechsler’s unfortunate word choice
(“neutral principles”) and to his somewhat incomplete and short-sighted
defense of the principle. As to “neutrality,” the word itself is an easy
target. If it is reduced to a call for a neutral magistrate, it states the
obvious; if it is meant to “neuter” values, as Post suggests it might, 57 it is
pernicious. On the other hand, if it suggests no more than a nondiscriminatory application of a legal standard to a general pattern, then it
might be entitled to more weight. I would read Wechsler’s neutrality
principle in this latter fashion. As such, I understand him to be saying
that a “neutral principle” is one that must be durable and capable of
application to a wide range of similarly situated cases. Neutrality here
does not relate to magistrates or values, but to applications. Professor
Kent Greenawalt captured this idea well when he observed that “[a]
person gives a neutral reason, in Wechsler’s sense, if he states a basis for
a decision that he would be willing to follow in other situations to which
it applies.” 58
This same idea of durability was expressed by Benjamin Cardozo
when he observed, “[g]iven a mass of particulars, a congeries of
judgments on related topics, the principle that unifies and rationalizes
them has a tendency, and a legitimate one, to project and extend itself to
new cases within the limits of its capacity to unify and rationalize.”59 He
further explained, such a durable principle, “has the primacy that comes

56. Id. at 1330–31.
57. Id. at 1330.
58. Kent Greenawalt, The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 982,
985 (1978).
59. CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 31.
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from natural and orderly and logical succession.” 60
Post’s non-consequentialist critique of neutrality is more troubling.
Certainly, a judge must attend to both the long- and short-term
consequences of her decision, and the anti-formalist principle fully
supports this proposition. As Post amply demonstrates, a decision cannot
be “purposive” and at the same time oblivious to consequences. 61 As
with neutrality, I would read Wechsler’s admonition that judges should
be aloof from the immediate consequences to mean that a judge should
not alter a durable principle simply to avoid a result that is averse to her
individual preferences. As Greenawalt puts it, “[t]he principles that
support a decision must be . . . adequately general as well as neutral.
They must reach out beyond the narrow circumstances of the case.” 62
That Wechsler can be interpreted as Post suggests may be a product
of Wechsler’s inability to discover a durable principle that would “reach
out beyond the narrow circumstances” 63 of Brown v. Board of
Education 64 and justify the series of per curiam anti-apartheid decisions
that applied Brown in contexts other than public school education. 65
Wechsler’s failure to discover such a durable principle may have tainted
“neutrality” as a persuasive ground from which to assess judicial
decision-making.
I strongly agree with Post that one should not adopt a vision of
judicial decision-making solely based on the judicial craft or on the
ability of a judge to discover and apply the law. Rather, courts must
recognize the long-term political and social consequences of their
decisions and sometimes act as lawmaking statesmen, as the Court did in
Brown. I also believe that Post and Frickey are correct when they assert
that the classic legal process theory invites precisely this type of
purposive statesmanship in appropriate and limited circumstances. 66 In
short, I would interpret Wechsler’s neutrality principle in a manner that
avoids Post’s non-consequentialist criticism.
Some of the other legal process postulates also require closer
examination. For example, the principle of institutional settlement exalts
the primacy of procedure over substantive rights. It is true that without
procedure there would be no enforceable substantive rights other than
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Post, supra note 28, at 1329.
Greenawalt, supra note 58, at 987.
Id.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See Wechsler, supra note 10, at 31–35.
See Frickey, supra note 28, at 454, 461; Post, supra note 28, at 1323, 1332–36.
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through the non-judicial will of the sovereign. It is equally true,
however, that without substantive rights there would be no point in
having a system of procedure. Procedure is instrumental. It exists to
ensure the fair and efficient delivery of justice, and the ends of justice
necessarily include the vindication of substantive rights. Hence, a fully
realized theory of legal process ought to factor in the extent to which
procedure accomplishes this ultimately substantive goal, namely, the
protection of individual claims of right.
D.

Legal Process and the Law of Federal Courts

In their path-breaking casebook, The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 67 Hart and Wechsler added a sixth principle to the legal process
method, namely, the principle of structural interpretation. Structural
interpretation requires federal courts to take principles of federalism and
separation of powers into account when creating, interpreting, or
applying the law of federal courts. 68 In fact, the very first sentence in the
preface to their casebook references the importance of “our federalism”
to the study of federal courts. 69 On the next page the authors offer a
similar, albeit less insistent, respect to the principle of separation of
powers. 70 The principle of structural interpretation is now often regarded
as an essential component of the legal process method in the context of
the law of federal courts. 71 Thus, in determining the allocation of powers
between federal courts and state courts, and between federal courts and
the political branches of the federal government, federalism and
separation of powers should, according to this expanded version of legal
process theory, play a critical role.
In my view, the principle of structural interpretation is premised on a
limited vision of constitutional values in that it emphasizes only two
aspects of our constitutional system—federalism and separation of
powers—at the expense of other equally weighty constitutional
considerations, including the structural role of the federal judiciary in the
vindication of individual claims of right. As the Court recognized in
Marbury v. Madison:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25.
See id. at xi.
Id.
Id. at xii.
Fallon, supra note 24, at 965.
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he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to
afford that protection . . . . The government of the United States
has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal
right. 72
The principle of structural interpretation thus needs to be more
broadly conceived. Federalism means something more than “states’
rights.” 73 It reflects a principle that defers to the states in matters
constitutionally pertinent to the states, while recognizing the paramount
interest of the national sovereign in matters pertinent to it. Similarly,
separation of powers is not merely a limit on the scope of judicial
authority; rather it also imposes an affirmative responsibility on the
judicial branch to act as a check on the political branches.
Finally, any complete theory of the law of federal courts must
incorporate the system of individual rights into the structural equation.
Federalism and separation of powers can themselves indirectly protect
individual rights by decentralizing the exercise of power. However, they
do not necessarily operate in that fashion, and the founding generation in
adopting the Bill of Rights eventually concluded that specific protections
for individual rights were an essential component of the constitutional
structure. Of course, we can see this same balancing of principles in the
individual rights component of constitutional structure as we do with
federalism and separation of powers. Individual rights are always subject
to countervailing constitutional interests. It is for this reason that no right
is absolute. But individual rights are, emphatically, part of the
constitutional structure. Hence, properly understood, the principle of
structural interpretation ought to take into account the full dimension of
constitutional considerations. Certainly, there is no case for making a
one-sided vision of “our federalism” the primary focus of a
jurisprudence of federal courts. 74
72. 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). Of course, famously, Mr. Marbury received no remedy from the
Supreme Court. Id. at 138. But this outcome was not because the law did not afford him a remedy,
but because Mr. Marbury sought his remedy in a constitutionally impermissible tribunal. Id. The
outcome, therefore, does not undermine the principle.
73. In Bond v. United States, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011), the Supreme Court asserted that
the principle of federalism embodied in the Tenth Amendment is also intended to protect the rights
of the individuals. Id. at 2364. But any such protection is at best indirect and surely does not
encompass the full range of individual rights protections embodied in the Constitution and in federal
statutes.
74. We can see the “our federalism” principle’s dominance at work in the related contexts of the
Younger doctrine, see Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 (1987); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66
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In addition, the principle of structural interpretation potentially runs
afoul of at least two other legal process principles: anti-formalism and
rule of law. As indicated above, the anti-formalism principle provides
that judicial interpretation should take into account a pluralistic array of
interests in interpreting the law. 75 Yet, the principle of structural
interpretation appears to give singular and dominant weight to a narrow
vision of structure over a vast array of other considerations, some of
which have a constitutional dimension. In this sense, the principle of
structural interpretation can be seen as a product of legal formalism, for
it introduces a rigid hierarchy into the interpretive metrics. The clash
with the rule of law principle is even more striking. That principle
implies the availability of federal courts to vindicate federal rights. 76
However, Hart and Wechsler’s law of federal courts is premised more on
power arrangements than it is on individual claims of right. In this way,
the principle of structural interpretation may illegitimately dominate the
rule of law principle.
E.

Modified Model of Legal Process

Drawing from legal process theory and the above-described critiques
and responses, I offer the following model to measure the legitimacy of
judicial decision-making in the context of the law of federal courts.
In measuring the legitimacy of any judicial decision pertaining to the
law of federal courts, one must: (1) take into account the respective
institutional roles of Congress and the judiciary; (2) accept the purposive
role of judicial decision-making, including both the craft and the
statesmen aspect of that role; (3) examine the consistency of the decision
with the rule of law and that principle’s insistence on a judicial forum
for the vindication of individual claims of right; and (4) measure the
decision based on its fidelity to durable legal principles articulated
through a reasoned elaboration. In addition, any such decision should
reflect the full range of structural concerns that animate the Constitution,
including a balanced approach to federalism, separation of powers, and
individual rights.
I have selected this model to test the legitimacy of judicial opinions in
the context of the law of federal courts because it is comprehensive,

(1971); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the Eleventh Amendment, see Seminole Tribe
v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999)—all cases in which access to
the federal courts was denied, thus forcing litigants to take their federal claims to state court.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 39–42.
76. See supra text accompanying notes 43–47.
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takes into account the full range of constitutional considerations, and
places courts within the legitimate and recognized bounds of the judicial
function. This model repels “the mechanistic and transcendental
nonsense of legal formalism” 77 and, at the same time, avoids an
unrestricted endorsement of legal realism by inviting results that are
premised on “predictable and nonsubjective conclusions.” 78
F.

A Claim-Centered, Fundamental Principles Approach to ArisingUnder Jurisdiction

I turn now to the specific context of arising-under jurisdiction and
identify its core principles. I then suggest an approach to arising-under
jurisdiction that is consistent with those principles and with my modified
approach to legal process and that avoids the trap of a formalistic or
mechanical formula.
The generally accepted model of arising-under jurisdiction begins
with the “Holmes creation test,” so named as a product of Oliver
Wendell Holmes’s dissenting declaration that “a suit cannot be said to
arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of action.” 79
This model presumes that the Holmes creation test represents the
primary vehicle for determining jurisdiction. 80 According to this view,
there are two limited exceptions to the creation test, one that extends
jurisdiction to some non-federal claims that include an essential federal
ingredient, and one that excludes jurisdiction over federally created
claims that are essentially governed by state or local law or in which the
presumed intent of Congress to create jurisdiction is otherwise
rebutted. 81 For several reasons that I will explain below, I believe this
standard view is misguided.
While it is sometimes thought that the creation test represents the
earliest approach to arising-under jurisdiction, this is by no means clear.
In their recent study, Professors Ann Woolhandler and Michael Collins
show that federal courts in the nineteenth century exercised jurisdiction
in numerous federal question cases well beyond the contours of the
77. Post, supra note 28, at 1320 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
78. Philip P. Frickey, Faithful Interpretation, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1090 (1995).
79. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180, 214 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
80. See Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064–65 (2013); Grable & Sons Metal
Prods., Inc., v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005).
81. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1064–65; Mims v. Arrow Financial Servs., LLC, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct.
740, 744 (2012); Grable, 545 U.S. at 311–13, 317 n.5; 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S
FEDERAL PRACTICE § 103.31[3] (2013); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3562 (3d ed. 1998).
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creation test. 82 This phenomenon occurred both before and after the
adoption of the Act of 1875, in which Congress vested federal courts
with general federal question jurisdiction. 83 Indeed, not a single case
references anything akin to a creation test prior to 1916, when the
Supreme Court’s opinion in American Well Works Co. v. Layne &
Bowler Co. 84 made a cryptic allusion to such a possibility. 85 Rather, the
vast body of early cases adopted a more inclusive and holistic approach
to arising-under jurisdiction, one that in no way depended on the source
of the claim or right asserted. As I will show below, even the decision in
American Well Works fits well within that established jurisprudence.
The 1900 decision in Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter 86 provides an apt
example of the holistic approach to arising-under jurisdiction. Shoshone
involved a dispute over the entitlement to a mining claim on federally
owned lands. 87 A federal statute required any person who disputed
another party’s application for a mining claim to file an “adverse suit” in
“a court of competent jurisdiction” within thirty days of having filed the
adverse claim with the register of land. 88 Either local custom or state
property law would usually determine entitlement to the property. 89 At
best, any potential federal issue remained in the background. As a
consequence, the Supreme Court concluded that such adverse claims did
not necessarily arise under federal law. 90
Shoshone is often described as an exception to the creation test, 91 but
that description is inaccurate. At the time Shoshone was decided, there
was no creation test—American Well Works was still sixteen years in the
future. It is also not clear that the federal statute at issue in Shoshone
created a cause of action because that statute is worded more as a statute
of limitations than as a cause of action. 92 Most importantly, however, the
82. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, Federal Question Jurisdiction and Justice Holmes,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2151 (2009).
83. Id. at 2157–70.
84. 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 102–108.
86. 177 U.S. 505 (1900).
87. Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 87 F. 801, 801–02 (9th Cir. 1898).
88. Shoshone, 177 U.S. at 506 (internal quotation marks omitted).
89. Id. at 508.
90. Id. at 509.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81.
92. The congressional statute at issue in Shoshone provided:
It shall be the duty of the adverse claimant, within thirty days after filing his claim, to
commence proceedings in a court of competent jurisdiction, to determine the question of the
right of possession, and prosecute the same with reasonable diligence to final judgment; and a
failure so to do shall be a waiver of his adverse claim.
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rationale adopted by the Shoshone Court did not focus on the source of
the plaintiff’s right to sue, but rather on whether the adverse suit called
for the “construction or effect” of federal law.93 As such, Shoshone does
not represent an exception to a rule, but an application of a rule.
The Court took a similar principled approach in Shulthis v.
McDougal. 94 There, the plaintiff filed a lawsuit in a federal circuit court
seeking to quiet title to a tract of land located on an Indian reservation. 95
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. 96 In response, plaintiff argued that the case was one
arising under federal law because the ownership of the tract was
ultimately traceable to a grant from the federal government. 97 In
resolving the jurisdictional question, the Court explained that “[a] suit to
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is
not necessarily, or for that reason alone, one arising under those laws.” 98
Rather, in the Court’s view, a case arises under federal law only if “it
really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the
validity, construction, or effect of such a law, upon the determination of
which the result depends.” 99 Applying that principle, the Court rejected
plaintiff’s attempt to premise jurisdiction solely on the federal source of
his claimed right of ownership. 100 Instead, the Court explained that for a
case to fall within the scope of statutory arising-under jurisdiction, it was
not enough that federal law be the source of the rights sought to be
enforced. 101
We now come to American Well Works. 102 The notion that the
American Well Works Court endorsed the creation test as the true
measure of arising-under jurisdiction is erroneous. American Well Works
involved a suit by an individual who claimed that his business had been
damaged by the defendant’s disparagement of his patent and by the

Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, § 7, 17 Stat. 93 (codified as amended at 30 U.S.C. §§ 29–30 (2006))
(emphasis added). Clearly, the language of the statute speaks in terms of a duty to file a claim and
not in terms suggesting the creation of any such claim.
93. 177 U.S. at 507 (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. 225 U.S. 561 (1912).
95. Id. at 565.
96. Id. at 568.
97. Id. at 569–70.
98. Id. at 569.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 569–70.
101. Id. at 568–69.
102. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257 (1916).
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defendant’s threat to sue him and his customers for patent
infringement. 103 The Court explained that plaintiff’s claim involved no
controversy over a question of federal law, including patent law. 104 The
fact that the narrative of the case somehow involved a patent was not
enough to make the case one arising under patent law.105 Rather, the case
involved no more than a state-created disparagement of business claim
in which patent law played no role. Hence, federal question jurisdiction
was lacking. 106
This result in American Well Works was fully consistent with
Shoshone and Shulthis, since the case did not involve a “controversy
respecting the validity, construction, or effect of” federal law.107
However, Justice Holmes, writing for the American Well Works Court,
wrapped his conclusion in an epigram: “[a] suit arises under the law that
creates the cause of action.” 108 Given the precedents then extant, this
pithy statement was both too broad and too narrow, for it substituted a
mechanical test for the careful consideration of the role that a federal
issue might play within the context of the pending case.
That American Well Works had not endorsed a “creation test” was
made clear five years later, in Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co. 109
There, the plaintiff, a shareholder in the defendant trust company, sued
the trust seeking to enjoin it from purchasing bonds that had been issued
under the terms of a federal statute that the plaintiff claimed to be
unconstitutional. 110 Because the trust was only authorized to purchase
“legal” bonds, the plaintiff claimed that the planned purchase of the
federal bonds represented a breach of fiduciary duty, a claim created by
state law. 111 Notwithstanding, the Court held that the case was one
arising under federal law because the directors were proceeding to
purchase the bonds and because the shareholder objected to that purpose
on the ground that the bonds “were issued under an unconstitutional
law.” 112 Thus, in the Court’s view the case arose under federal law
because “the constitutional validity of an act of Congress . . . is directly
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 258–59.
Id. at 259–60.
Id. at 260.
Id.
Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569 (1912).
241 U.S. at 260; see also Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78.
255 U.S. 180 (1921).
Id. at 195–96.
Id. at 197–98.
Id. at 201.
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drawn in question.” 113
The decision in Smith did not create a novel approach to jurisdiction.
In fact, as Woolhandler and Collins have amply demonstrated, Smith
reflected a standard exercise of federal question jurisdiction that was
well recognized in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.114
Justice Holmes dissented, and took his epigram a step further by
insisting on the exclusivity of the creation principle: “a suit cannot be
said to arise under any other law than that which creates the cause of
action.” 115 But the majority, following the standard line of jurisprudence,
clearly rejected this view. In fact, the majority neither referenced
American Well Works nor responded to Justice Holmes’s solo dissent. 116
The American Well Works majority was not alone in overlooking the
creation test. In the ensuing years, that test played virtually no role in the
Court’s arising under jurisprudence. 117 Indeed, it did not rise to
prominence in that jurisprudence until the Court’s decision in Franchise
Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust in 1983. 118
According to Woolhandler and Collins, Holmes’s creation test
formula might have been the result of “[Holmes’s] collapsing of the
concepts of primary and remedial rights as part of his predictive view of
law.” 119 Similarly, Professor Lumen Mulligan argues that Holmes’s
position stemmed “from his famous ‘bad man’ theory of law—the view
that law is best understood not from a moral vantage point, but from that
of the bad man who cares only to know the predictable judicial
responses to his conduct.” 120 In other words, according to Mulligan,
113. Id.
114. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78.
115. Smith, 255 U.S. at 214 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
116. See id. at 195–213.
117. Prior to 1983, only four Supreme Court majority opinions cited American Well Works, and
none of those citations endorsed the creation test or suggested that any such test was the exclusive
or even primary method through which to establish arising-under jurisdiction. See Hathorn v.
Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 266 n.18 (1981) (state courts may decide a variety of questions involving
patent law); Int’l Ass’n of Machinists, AFL-CIO v. Central Airlines, Inc., 372 U.S. 682, 696 (1963)
(included in string cite pertaining to jurisdiction); Freeman v. Bee Mach. Co., 319 U.S. 448, 451 n.4
(1943) (defects in state court jurisdiction not cured by removal); Lambert Run Coal Co. v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 258 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) (same).
118. 463 U.S. 1 (1983). The creation test did, however, hold a prominent position in the first
edition of Hart & Wechsler’s casebook, perhaps paving the way to its eventual inclusion in the
Court’s arising-under jurisprudence. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 25, at 752.
119. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2187.
120. Lumen N. Mulligan, You Can’t Go Holmes Again, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (2012); see
also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459–60 (1897) (“If
you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a bad man, who cares only for the
material consequences which such knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds

07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

ARISING-UNDER JURISDICTION

10/10/2013 5:11 PM

981

Holmes’s jurisdictional theory “focused solely upon the enforcement
aspect of law, which in the civil context corresponds to causes of action
and not rights per se.” 121 Mulligan’s view is that Holmes’s endorsement
of a cause-of-action-centric test was both out of step with the thencurrent jurisprudential developments in cases such as Shoshone and
Smith, 122 and insufficient to fully embrace the full range of jurisdictional
possibilities that had been and continued to be recognized by the
Court. 123 Mulligan’s solution is to include “rights” as part of the
jurisdictional equation and, in so doing, his goal is to create a
presumption in favor of the exercise of arising-under jurisdiction. 124
I agree with Mulligan’s conclusion but not with his solution. Holmes
may have indeed adopted the creation test to conform to his bad-man
theory of law, and his creation-centric approach to jurisdiction is
certainly inconsistent with the full range of jurisdictional possibilities.
The true mistake Holmes made, however, was in assuming that the
cause-of-action component of his equation somehow defined the scope
of jurisdiction, which is not necessarily so. Mulligan’s solution is simply
to add the component of “rights” to the jurisdictional equation, but this
solution invites a similar mechanical approach to jurisdiction by adding
yet another incomplete test to the inquiry.
his reasons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer sanctions of
conscience . . . . [The bad man] does not care two straws for the axioms or deductions, but that he
does want to know what the Massachusetts or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of
his mind.”).
121. Mulligan, supra note 120, at 240.
122. Id. at 244–50. The core principle that guided the analysis in cases like Shoshone and Shulthis
did not focus on the distinction between causes of action and rights, but rather on the claim, which
is a composite of rights and remedies.
123. Id. Mulligan’s analysis was prompted by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Mims v.
Arrow Financial Services, LLC, __U.S.__, 132 S. Ct. 740 (2012). Mulligan praises that opinion for
breaking with the Holmes cause-of-action-centric tradition and for recasting the standard §1331 test
as one that looks to both the cause of action and the right. Although Mulligan’s interpretation of the
Mims decision is attractive, I don’t think that that opinion can carry the weight of his conclusions.
The distinction between causes of action and rights was certainly not necessary to the holding in
Mims and the decision in Mims is just as consistent with the Holmes creation test as it is with
Mulligan’s more inclusive approach to federal arising-under jurisdiction. At most, the Mims
decision supports the proposition that when federal law creates the cause of action and establishes
the rule of decision, there is a strong presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction, but in a sense this
is really a reiteration of the creation test. In addition, the language from Mims that Mulligan relies
on is, by his own admission, “inconsistent,” suggesting that the Court was not aware that it was
making the sophisticated move that Mulligan attributes to it. See Mulligan, supra note 120, at 280.
Further evidence that Mims did not change the jurisprudential landscape can be found in Gunn v.
Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013), where the Court returned to the cause-of-action-centric
position, treating it as the primary vehicle for establishing arising-under jurisdiction. Id. at 1064.
124. See Mulligan, supra note 120, at 287.
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My approach is different. I would rather focus the jurisdictional
inquiry on what constitutes a “claim.” Such an approach, as I have
shown, is both principled and consistent with the traditional approach to
arising-under jurisdiction, and is also consistent with the modern
understanding of what constitutes a litigation unit. Under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (and under the modern law of res judicata or
preclusion), a claim is defined by reference to the facts that establish a
legal right to relief. 125 To paraphrase Holmes, a claim arises only under
the sovereign law that creates it. But some claims are hybrid, their
component parts being created by more than one sovereign. Such claims
arise under the laws of all contributing sovereigns, regardless of which
created the cause of action, which created the right, or which created the
controlling legal principle. The Holmesian error was not in Holmes’s
collapse of causes of action and rights into a single concept—which is
essentially to say “a claim upon which relief can be granted”—but in his
failure to see that the unification did not dictate the narrow jurisdictional
test he ultimately endorsed.
Mulligan falls into a similar trap by drawing a bright line between
causes of action and rights. Unlike Holmes, Mulligan would allow
jurisdiction in cases falling on either side of the line. 126 And such an
approach can be used to validate a wider range of the Court’s arisingunder jurisprudence. But it also invites a mechanical distinction between
claims created by federal law and claims that merely include a federal
ingredient. In fact, Mulligan’s test would not validate decisions such as
Smith, where neither the cause of action nor the right was a creature of
federal law. Rather, federal law was simply an element of the plaintiff’s
state-created claim. Yet, despite the absence of both a federal cause of
action and a federal right, the Court nonetheless found jurisdiction
because the plaintiff’s claim turned on a question of federal law.
With a proper reading of the foundational arising-under cases—e.g.,
Shoshone, Shulthis, Smith, and American Well Works—and with a
clearer understanding of what constitutes a claim upon which a relief can
be granted, the approach I endorse in Part II focuses on the nature of the
plaintiff’s claim, asking whether the resolution of that claim depends on
the validity, construction, or effect of federal law.

125. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a) (same transaction test for purposes of compulsory
counterclaims); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24 (1982) (same transaction
test for purposes of claim preclusion).
126. Mulligan, supra note 120, at 248–50.
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GULLY REDISCOVERED

Congress first vested the lower federal courts with general “arisingunder” jurisdiction in the Act of March 3, 1875 (Act of 1875), 127 thereby
giving them “the vast range of power which had lain dormant in the
Constitution since 1789. These courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of
fair dealing between citizens of different states and became the primary
and powerful reliances for vindicating every right given by the
Constitution, the laws, and treaties of the United States.” 128 The
available evidence suggests that Congress, in passing the Act of 1875,
thought that it was vesting lower federal courts with the complete range
of Article III arising-under jurisdiction. 129 As one sponsor of the
measure explained, the Act gives the federal judiciary “precisely the
power which the Constitution confers—nothing more, nothing less.” 130
Significantly, at that time, the enforcement of federal rights was often
dependent on common law and state-created remedies. 131 Hence, hybrid
“federal-ingredient” claims would not have been considered unusual or
even distinct from a jurisdictional perspective.
By the first half of the twentieth century, the fundamental principles
of statutory arising-under jurisdiction were sufficiently familiar and so
well-settled that in 1936 the Court in Gully v. First National Bank 132
could describe them with confident clarity:
How and when a case arises “under the Constitution or laws of the
United States” has been much considered in the books. Some tests are
well established. To bring a case within the statute, a right or immunity
created by the Constitution or laws of the United States must be an
element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff’s cause of action. The right

127. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (1875).
128. FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES MCCAULEY LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 65 (1928).
129. In Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983), the
Court observed:
The statute’s “arising under” language tracks similar language in art. III, § 2, of the
Constitution, which has been construed as permitting Congress to extend federal jurisdiction to
any case of which federal law potentially “forms an ingredient,” see Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 9 Wheat. 738, 823, 6 L.Ed. 204 (1824), and its limited legislative history
suggests that the 44th Congress may have meant to “confer the whole power which the
Constitution conferred.”
Id. at 8 n.8 (citation omitted); see also Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal
Question Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717, 723, 723 n.32–34 (1986) (citing sources).
130. 2 Cong. Rec. 4987 (1874) (remarks of Sen. Carpenter).
131. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2157–70.
132. 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
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or immunity must be such that it will be supported if the Constitution or
laws of the United States are given one construction or effect, and
defeated if they receive another. A genuine and present controversy, not
merely a possible or conjectural one, must exist with reference thereto,
and the controversy must be disclosed upon the face of the complaint,
unaided by the answer or by the petition for removal. Indeed, the
complaint itself will not avail as a basis of jurisdiction in so far as it goes
beyond a statement of the plaintiff’s cause of action and anticipates or
replies to a probable defense. 133
As the Gully Court recognized, it was established early on that a
federal court could not exercise original or removal arising-under
jurisdiction unless the plaintiff’s complaint revealed a claim that
required resolution of a federal question. 134 A federal defense raised by
the defendant would not suffice. 135 Nor would it be sufficient for the
plaintiff to anticipate such a defense. 136 The explanation for this rule was
that a federal court should be able to assess jurisdiction at the outset by
examining the pleadings then before it. 137
Beyond this “well-pleaded complaint” rule, the approach to federal
jurisdiction was directed more toward a flexible assessment of the nature
of the federal issue presented and the role that issue played as an element
of the jurisdiction-invoking claim. As noted above, this jurisdictional
formula had deep roots in the nineteenth century 138 and was also fully
supported by precedent from the early twentieth century.
The facts of Gully were simple and informative. First National Bank
agreed to assume the debts of an insolvent national banking
association. 139 Among those debts were taxes owed to the State of
Mississippi. 140 When Gully, the state tax collector, sued First National
Bank in state court to collect those debts, First National Bank removed
the case to federal court on the theory that it was one arising under
federal law since federal law authorized states to tax national banking

133. Id. at 112–13 (citations omitted).
134. Id. at 197–98; see also Metcalf v. City of Watertown, 128 U.S. 586, 589 (1888).
135. Tennessee v. Union & Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454, 459 (1894).
136. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
137. Metcalf, 128 U.S. at 589–90.
138. See McCain v. City of Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168 (1899); St. Joseph & G.I.R. Co. v. Steele,
167 U.S. 659, 662 (1897); Walker v. Collins, 167 U.S. 57, 59 (1897); Ex parte Lennon, 166 U.S.
548, 553–54 (1897); Starin v. City of New York, 115 U.S. 248, 257 (1885); see also Woolhandler &
Collins, supra note 82, at 2171–78.
139. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 111 (1936).
140. Id.
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associations. 141 In concluding that federal jurisdiction did not exist, the
Supreme Court first explained that Gully’s claim was built on a contract
that was governed by Mississippi law. 142 While defendant argued that a
federal controversy existed because the validity of a tax imposed on a
nationally chartered bank was ultimately a question of federal law, the
Court disagreed, explaining that federal law played absolutely no role in
the resolution of the plaintiff’s claim. 143
The Gully Court noted that the key element in the federal question
jurisdiction analysis was the nature of the claim presented:
This Court has had occasion to point out how futile is the
attempt to define a “cause of action” without reference to the
context. To define broadly and in abstract “a case arising under
the Constitution or laws of the United States” has hazards of a
kindred order. What is needed is something of that commonsense accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations
which characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of
causation. One could carry the search for causes backward,
almost without end. Instead, there has been a selective process
which picks the substantial causes out of the web and lays the
other ones aside. As in problems of causation, so here in the
search for the underlying law. If we follow the ascent far
enough, countless claims of right can be discovered to have their
source or their operative limits in the provisions of a federal
statute or in the Constitution itself with its circumambient
restrictions upon legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit,
the courts have formulated the distinction between controversies
that are basic and those that are collateral, between disputes that
are necessary and those that are merely possible. We shall be
lost in a maze if we put that compass by. 144

141. Id. at 112.
142. Id. at 114.
143. Id. at 115–16.
144. Id. 117–18 (internal citations omitted). Years before his decision in Gully, Cardozo had
expressed similar views on legal analysis, when he observed:
There is the constant need, as every law student knows, to separate the accidental and the nonessential from the essential and inherent . . . . Only half or less than half of the work has yet
been done. The problem remains to fix the bounds and the tendencies of development and
growth, to set the directive force in motion along the right path at the parting of the ways. The
directive force of a principle may be exerted along the line of logical progression; this I will
call the rule of analogy or the method of philosophy; along the line of historical development;
this I will call the method of evolution; along the line of the customs of the community; this I
will call the method of tradition; along the lines of justice, morals and social welfare, the mores
of the day; this I will call the method of sociology.
CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 30–31.
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Thus, until the decision in Gully, the only jurisdictional bright-line
rule the Court had endorsed was the well-pleaded complaint rule, and the
Court’s jurisprudence drew no distinction between claims created by
federal law and state-law claims that included an essential federal
ingredient. That aside, the law of federal question jurisdiction was
governed by a claim-centered, arising-under jurisdictional theory that
focused on the nature of the claim and the role that federal law played
within that claim.
Given the lyrical language of the Gully opinion, one might be tempted
to think that the standard is open-ended and indeterminate. But that is far
from the case. In fact, Gully offers clear guidance as to the key question
that should inform the arising-under jurisdiction analysis. That question
asks whether the “right or immunity [is] such that it will be supported if
the Constitution or laws of the United States are given one construction
or effect, and defeated if they receive another.” 145 In other words, the
goal is to determine whether resolution of the plaintiff’s claim turns on a
question of federal law. This test, although precise in its focus, is not
mechanical since it realistically acknowledges the kaleidoscopic range of
possibilities in which such a federal question might arise.
Gully can be seen as a nearly perfect exemplar of both the classic and
modified versions of legal process as previously described. In terms of
the principle of institutional settlement, the opinion assigns courts a role
that is appropriate and consistent with congressional intent, namely the
determination of whether a particular claim falls within the broad sweep
of jurisdiction vested in the federal courts by the Constitution and by
Congress. Certainly one gets no sense that Gully invites the judiciary to
engage in anything but a legitimate judicial function. Further, Gully
cannot be described as formalistic in any sense. Rather, it invites a
flexible but principled assessment of jurisdiction that cannot be
measured by any simple bright-line or mechanical rule, but that should
nonetheless lead to results that are premised on predictable and
nonsubjective questions and conclusions. By focusing its attention on
the claim, the Gully Court establishes a principle that respects the
individual claims of right. This approach is consistent with the full range
of structural concerns that animate the Constitution, including a balanced
approach to federalism, separation of powers, and individual rights.
Finally, the analysis is premised on a rational explanation of a durable
legal principle—one that had been used effectively for at least sixty
years before Gully—that focuses on the nature of the claim.

145. Gully, 299 U.S. at 112.
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III. THE MECHANICAL APPROACH TO ARISING-UNDER
JURISDICTION
As explained earlier, one of the critical factors in the legal process
method is the requirement of reasoned elaboration. 146 And as Professor
Fallon pointed out, the legal process scholarly agenda requires a careful
examination and critique of doctrine. 147 Thus, the following discussion
provides a relatively detailed examination of five major cases, all of
which stray from the legal process path in one way or another, and all of
which suffer from a lack of reasoned elaboration.
A.

Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust

Gully remained the foundational federal question case for several
decades, without any apparent deviation from the approach it
endorsed. 148 Indeed, it has been cited and relied on by the Supreme
Court and lower courts up to the present time. 149 However, the Supreme
Court’s approach to federal question jurisdiction began to diverge from
Gully’s path in 1983 with the decision in Franchise Tax Board v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust. 150 There, the California
Franchise Tax Board sought a levy on funds held in trust for three
construction workers by the Construction Laborers Vacation Trust
(CLVT). 151 The Tax Board claimed a right to the funds based on the
members’ failure to pay the state income tax. 152 When the trustee refused
to meet the Tax Board’s demands, the Tax Board filed an action in
California state court seeking damages for the amount of the taxes owed
and a declaration that its right to those funds was not preempted by the
federal Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
146. See supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
147. Fallon, supra note 24, at 977.
148. See, e.g., Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 415 U.S. 125, 128 (1974); Oneida Indian
Nation v. Cnty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 675 (1974); Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339
U.S. 667, 672 (1950); see also PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL J. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO & HERBERT
WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURT AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 884 (2d ed.
1973); JOHN J. COUND, JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE CASES
AND MATERIALS 190 (2d ed. 1974).
149. E.g., Vaden v. Discover Bank, 556 U.S. 49, 78 (2009); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v.
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 321 (2005); Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 808 (1988); Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 820 (1986) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
150. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
151. Id. at 5–6.
152. Id. at 6.
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(ERISA). 153 CLVT removed the case to federal court on the theory that
the plaintiff’s action for declaratory relief arose under federal law. 154
The plaintiff filed a motion to remand, which the trial court denied,
ruling that ERISA did not preempt the State’s claims. 155 The Court of
Appeals affirmed on the jurisdictional question, but reversed on the
merits. 156 On certiorari, the Supreme Court addressed only the
jurisdictional issue. 157
The Court’s jurisdictional inquiry focused largely on the claim for
declaratory relief. As the Court explained, the decision in Skelly Oil Co.
v. Phillips Petroleum Co. 158 had held that the Federal Declaratory
Judgment Act did not expand the scope of federal arising-under
jurisdiction. 159 Although the immediate action was filed under the
California Declaratory Judgment Act, the Court ruled that the standard
applicable under Skelly Oil would also apply to actions filed under state
declaratory judgment statutes. 160 Under Skelly Oil, federal question
jurisdiction is satisfied only if one of the parties to the declaratory relief
action could have filed a coercive suit against the opposing party that
itself would arise under federal law consistent with the well-pleaded
complaint rule. 161 Hence, if the party filing for declaratory relief does no
more than seek a declaration that its claimed right is not preempted by
federal law, the case does not arise under federal law for purposes of
§ 1331, since, in a suit by that party to enforce that right, the federal
preemption question would be raised by the defendant as a defense to the
action. 162 But if the declaratory judgment defendant would have a
coercive federal preemption claim against the declaratory judgment
plaintiff, 163 then the case will in fact arise under federal law. 164
Although the Tax Board’s claim for declaratory relief did seek a

153. Id. at 5–7.
154. Id. at 7–8.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
159. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 15–17.
160. Id. at 18–19.
161. Id. at 19.
162. Id. at 16.
163. See, e.g., Osborn v. Bank of the U.S., 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
164. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 19 (“Federal courts have regularly taken original jurisdiction
over declaratory judgment suits in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal question.”).
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declaration that federal law did not preempt its claim, 165 there was
something more to the case. As the Court explained, “[f]ederal courts
have regularly taken original jurisdiction over declaratory judgment suits
in which, if the declaratory judgment defendant brought a coercive
action to enforce its rights, that suit would necessarily present a federal
question.” 166 The Court then noted that § 502(a)(3) of ERISA
specifically granted “trustees of ERISA-covered plans like CLVT a
cause of action for injunctive relief when their rights and duties under
ERISA are at issue.” 167 Having so noted, the Court asked whether the
Tax Board’s claim for declaratory relief arose under federal law.168
Given that CLVT had a claim for coercive relief under ERISA—a claim
that was the mirror image of the Tax Board’s “defensive” claim for
declaratory relief—the obvious answer would seem to be “yes.”
The Court, however, concluded that jurisdiction was lacking:
We have always interpreted what Skelly Oil called “the current
of jurisdictional legislation since the Act of March 3, 1875,”
with an eye to practicality and necessity . . . . There are good
reasons why the federal courts should not entertain suits by the
States to declare the validity of their regulations despite possibly
conflicting federal law. States are not significantly prejudiced by
an inability to come to federal court for a declaratory judgment
in advance of a possible injunctive suit by a person subject to
federal regulation. They have a variety of means by which they
can enforce their own laws in their own courts, and they do not
suffer if the preemption questions such enforcement may raise
are tested there. The express grant of federal jurisdiction in
ERISA is limited to suits brought by certain parties as to whom
Congress presumably determined that a right to enter federal
court was necessary to further the statute’s purposes. It did not
go so far as to provide that any suit against such parties must
also be brought in federal court when they themselves did not
choose to sue. 169

165. Id. at 6–7.
166. Id. at 19.
167. Id. at 19–20.
168. Id. at 20.
169. Id. at 20–21 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also id. at 27
(“Nevertheless, CLVT’s argument that appellant’s second cause of action arises under ERISA fails
for the second reason given above. ERISA carefully enumerates the parties entitled to seek relief
under § 502; it does not provide anyone other than participants, beneficiaries, or fiduciaries with an
express cause of action for a declaratory judgment on the issues in this case. A suit for similar relief
by some other party does not ‘arise under’ that provision.”).
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The Court also held that the Tax Board’s suit to enforce tax levies was
not subject to the complete preemption doctrine, since such tax
proceedings were “not of central concern” to ERISA. 170
While the Court’s introductory discussion of the law of federal
question jurisdiction suggested a relatively traditional approach to the
topic, the Court’s application of the traditional standards was novel to
say the least. Clearly, CLVT qualified as a declaratory judgment
defendant with a coercive claim that presented a substantial federal
question, namely, whether the State’s action was preempted by ERISA.
Thus, under Skelly Oil, and as the Court itself had just explained, 171 the
case presented a substantial federal issue consistent with the wellpleaded complaint rule as applied in actions for declaratory relief.
However, the Court’s analysis ignored this factor and instead took a
surprising turn driven by the open-ended policy considerations of
“practicality and necessity.” 172 The immediately preceding block
quotation 173 provides the Court’s entire discussion of the relevant policy.
Essentially, the Court reasoned that federal jurisdiction was lacking
since the State could vindicate its rights in state court and since Congress
had not expressly given the State access to the federal forum. 174 The fact
that Congress clearly wanted ERISA-preemption claims litigated in
federal courts seemed irrelevant. Nor did the Court credit the fact that
Congress had vested parties such as CLVT with a right to a federal
forum.
Judged against the classic and modified legal process method, the
Franchise Tax Board opinion is deficient in several respects. As already
noted, it abandoned a well-established and durable principle in service of
a vague policy judgment seemingly designed to resolve the specific case
before it. In addition, the Court’s opinion betrayed the principle of
reasoned elaboration given the empty space that fell between the Court’s
description of arising-under standards and the Court’s ultimate and
inexplicable conclusion that those standards had not been satisfied.
Finally, the Court denied jurisdiction in the face of clear congressional
intent to the contrary, and in violation of the principles of institutional
settlement and separation of powers.

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id. at 25–26.
Id. at 20–21.
See id. at 20.
See supra text accompanying note 169.
Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 21.

07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]
B.

ARISING-UNDER JURISDICTION

10/10/2013 5:11 PM

991

Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson

In 1986, the Court in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v.
Thompson 175 took Franchise Tax Board’s “practicality and necessity” 176
approach a step further. There, two sets of parents, residents of Canada
and Scotland, respectively, sued Merrell Dow, a drug manufacturer,
claiming that their children had suffered birth defects caused by a drug
manufactured by the defendant and ingested by the mothers while
pregnant. 177 The suit was filed in an Ohio state court and removed to
federal court by the defendant. 178 The defendant argued that the case
arose under federal law because one of the six claims asserted by the
plaintiffs relied on an alleged violation of the labeling standard imposed
by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the violation of
which was said to create a presumption of negligence under state law. 179
The plaintiffs filed a motion to remand arguing that no federal question
was presented in their suit. 180 The defendants responded by filing a
motion to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. 181 The district
court denied plaintiffs’ motion to remand but granted the defendant’s
motion to dismiss. 182 The court of appeals, addressing only the
jurisdictional issue, reversed in a one-page opinion, concluding that
federal law was not necessarily implicated in the plaintiffs’ suit and that,
as a consequence, the case did not arise under federal law.183 The
question before the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiffs’ claim
arose under federal law for purposes of § 1331. 184
Adopting the policy-driven approach endorsed by the Court three
years earlier in Franchise Tax Board, 185 the focus of the majority
opinion was less on the nature of the action, as had been the focus of the
court of appeals, and more on the “dictates of sound judicial policy” that,
in the majority’s view, should justify the exercise of federal
175. 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
176. See 463 U.S. at 20.
177. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805–06.
178. Id.
179. Id. Although alienage jurisdiction was satisfied under § 1332(a)(2), the case could not be
removed under § 1441 since Merrell Dow was a resident of the forum state. Id. at 806 n.1; see also
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1982).
180. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 806.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Thompson v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., 766 F.2d 1005, 1006 (6th Cir. 1985).
184. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810.
185. See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 20 (1983).
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jurisdiction. 186 Thus, according to the Court, the “‘increased complexity
of federal legislation and the increased volume of federal litigation,’ as
well as ‘the desirability of a more careful scrutiny of legislative intent,’”
were key considerations that should be taken into account in determining
whether a case satisfied the arising-under standard. 187
In concluding that there was no federal question jurisdiction in this
case, the most significant factor to the Court, however, was the untested
assumption that Congress had not intended to create a private right of
action to enforce the FDCA. 188 From this assumption, the Court further
assumed that Congress also intended to preclude the exercise of federal
jurisdiction over state law claims premised on a violation of an FDCA
standard. 189 In response to the petitioner’s argument that the claim
included a substantial federal question, 190 the Court replied that the
absence of a congressionally created private right of action was
“tantamount to a congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed
violation of the statute as an element of a state cause of action is
insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.” 191
Thus, in Merrell Dow, a judicially imposed policy judgment, driven
by case-management concerns and mechanically applied, operated as a
determinative measure of substantiality. In fact, the Court attributed a
variety of meanings to the word “substantial,” further enhancing the
scope of its discretion to reject federal jurisdiction in these cases.
“Substantial,” said the Court, could connote meaningfulness within the
context of the pending case, 192 importance to the federal system in a way

186. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 810 (quoting Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 379 (1959)).
187. Id. at 811–12 (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353,
377 (1982)).
188. Id. at 812.
189. Id.
190. The petitioner contended that “the case represents a straightforward application of the
statement in Franchise Tax Board that federal-question jurisdiction is appropriate when ‘it appears
that some substantial, disputed question of federal law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded state claims.’” Id. at 813 (quoting Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. at 13).
191. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814.
192. Id. at 814 n.12 (quoting Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561, 569–70 (1912)) (“A suit to
enforce a right which takes its origin in the laws of the United States is not necessarily, or for that
reason alone, one arising under those laws, for a suit does not so arise unless it really and
substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction or effect of such
a law, upon the determination of which the result depends. This is especially so of a suit involving
rights to land acquired under a law of the United States. If it were not, every suit to establish title to
land in the central and western States would so arise, as all titles in those States are traceable back to
those laws[.]”).
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that transcended the pending case, 193 or non-frivolousness as a matter of
substantive law. 194 The federal issue presented in Merrell Dow was
insubstantial under any of these standards, and proof of that
insubstantiality required no resort to the Court’s newly crafted policy
judgment. Instead, the Court could have asked and answered a simple
question: Was the case one that was truly about federal law?
In order to answer this question, a little background might be helpful.
The lawyer who represented the two sets of parents in Merrell Dow had
previously filed a virtually identical suit against the company in the
same federal district court, invoking that court’s diversity jurisdiction,
but representing different (also foreign) plaintiffs. 195 The district court
dismissed that case on forum non conveniens grounds. 196 The lawyer,
with new foreign clients in hand, then sued Merrell Dow in an Ohio state
court asserting essentially the same claims. 197 Merrell Dow, quite
plainly, wanted this new iteration of the case in the same federal court
that had earlier dismissed on forum non conveniens grounds. Since 28
U.S.C. § 1441(b) precluded removal on diversity grounds 198—Merrell
Dow being a citizen of Ohio for purposes of diversity—the only
possibility was removal as a federal question case. So the fight over
jurisdiction was really a fight over forum non conveniens.
The focus on forum non conveniens helps explain why the
plaintiffs—who invoked federal law in their complaint—argued against
jurisdiction, while the defendant—who denied the legitimacy of their
“federal claim”—argued that federal question jurisdiction was satisfied.
It is true that the plaintiffs’ complaints raised a potential violation of the
FDCA, but what is not apparent from the Merrell Dow decision is that
the federal issue was frivolous from the outset, and more a product of the
imagination of the lawyers representing Merrell Dow than anything else.
The text of the FDCA addresses itself to interstate and intrastate
transactions. It does not (at least on its face) purport to apply to drugs
manufactured and sold outside the United States. The drugs at issue in
193. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 814 (“We simply conclude that the congressional determination
that there should be no federal remedy for the violation of this federal statute is tantamount to a
congressional conclusion that the presence of a claimed violation of the statute as an element of a
state cause of action is insufficiently ‘substantial’ to confer federal-question jurisdiction.”).
194. Id. at 817 (“Although it is true that federal jurisdiction cannot be based on a frivolous or
insubstantial federal question . . . .”).
195. See In re Richardson-Merrell Inc., 545 F. Supp. 1130, 1130–32 (S.D. Ohio 1982).
196. Id. at 1136–37.
197. See Chambers v. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc., No. C-850888, 1986 WL 14901, at *1 (Ohio
App. Dec. 24, 1986).
198. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805 n.1.
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Merrell Dow were, in fact, manufactured and sold outside the United
States (though that was not revealed on the face of the complaint). 199
Merrell Dow nonetheless argued that the case presented a significant
question of whether the FDCA applied beyond the U.S. borders. 200 But
the plaintiffs had made no such claim; rather, their complaints seemed to
be based on the prayer that no one would notice that the statutory
standard they invoked was inapplicable under the circumstances
presented.
Returning to the question of whether this was a case that could be
heard by a federal court, the dissent, authored by Justice Brennan,201
questioned the logic of the majority’s reasoning. “Why,” the dissent
asked, “should the fact that Congress chose not to create a private
federal remedy mean that Congress would not want there to be federal
jurisdiction to adjudicate a state claim that imposes liability for violating
the federal law?” 202 As the dissent saw it, the decision not to provide a
private federal remedy should not affect federal jurisdiction unless the
reasons Congress withholds a federal remedy are also reasons for
withholding federal jurisdiction.203 In the dissent’s view, the majority
had not even considered that question. 204
As to the last point, the dissent observed that Congress had vested
district courts with exclusive jurisdiction over administrative actions
arising under the FDCA, strongly suggesting that the exercise of
jurisdiction in cases such as this would be consistent with congressional
intent as to the proper scope of federal question jurisdiction. 205 The
dissent’s explanation is worth a close reading:
Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law
expresses Congress’ determination that there is a federal interest in
having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a particular
norm established by that law . . . . It is the duty of courts to interpret
these laws and apply them in such a way that the congressional purpose
is realized. As noted above, Congress granted the district courts power to
hear cases “arising under” federal law in order to enhance the likelihood
that federal laws would be interpreted more correctly and applied more
199. Brief for Petitioner at 6–7, Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)
(No. 85-619).
200. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 816–17.
201. Id. at 818.
202. Id. at 825 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 830.
205. Id. at 831.
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uniformly. In other words, Congress determined that the availability of a
federal forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would
make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in the way
that Congress intended.
By making federal law an essential element of a state-law claim, the
State places the federal law into a context where it will operate to shape
behavior: the threat of liability will force individuals to conform their
conduct to interpretations of the federal law made by courts adjudicating
the state-law claim . . . . Consequently, the possibility that the federal
law will be incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the
state-law claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the
district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal questions in
precisely the same way as if it was federal law that “created” the cause
of action. It therefore follows that there is federal jurisdiction under
§ 1331. 206
The views of the dissent are well taken. The majority opinion
replaced the fundamental inquiry into the nature of the federal issue and
the role of that issue within that lawsuit with an abstract policy judgment
based on a presumed congressional intent. The dissent, on the other
hand, returned the analysis to durable principles of general applicability,
more consistent with Gully and with the Court’s obligation to exercise
the jurisdiction intentionally vested in it by Congress—and thus more in
line with legal process.
C.

Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.

In 1988, the Court added another consideration to the arising-under
analysis. In Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 207 the
plaintiff sued his former employer in a federal court, claiming violations
of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and state law tortious
interference with his business relationships. 208 The defendant responded
by arguing that its conduct was justified by a need to protect its trade
secrets and by filing a variety of counterclaims based on the plaintiff’s
alleged misappropriation of one of defendant’s patent specifications. 209
The precise question before the Supreme Court was whether either the
Seventh Circuit or the Federal Circuit had appellate jurisdiction over this

206.
207.
208.
209.

Id. at 827–28.
486 U.S. 800 (1988).
Id. at 805.
Id. at 805–06.
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case. 210 The answer to that question depended on whether the case arose
under patent law within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1338, for if it did,
then appellate jurisdiction would lie exclusively in the Federal Circuit.211
The Court held that the case was not one arising under patent law since
the plaintiff’s antitrust claim rested on two theories, only one of which
relied on patent law. 212 In adopting this “alternative theories” approach
to arising-under jurisdiction, the Court relied on language from its
decision in Franchise Tax Board:
If “on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are . . . reasons
completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of [the patent laws]
why the [plaintiff] may or may not be entitled to the relief it
seeks,” . . . then the claim does not “arise under” those laws. 213
The Christianson Court further limited the scope of federal question
jurisdiction by adding yet another mechanical test—specifically, the
alternative theories test. 214 In adopting this approach, the Court did not
define or even consider the difference between separate claims, separate
theories on the same claim, and the possibility of having original
jurisdiction over some claims (and/or theories) and supplemental
jurisdiction over others. Moreover, the Court’s reliance on Franchise
Tax Board as establishing an alternative-theories test was completely
misplaced, since the Court in Franchise Tax Board neither adopted nor
alluded to any such test. Rather, the language from Franchise Tax Board
that the Christianson Court relied on was simply used as an explanation
as to why the complete preemption doctrine did not apply to that case. 215
This obvious misreading of a precedent certainly flies in the face of the

210. Id. at 803–04, 806–07.
211. Id. at 807.
212. Id. at 810–12.
213. Id. at 810 (alterations in original) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 26 (1983)).
214. The Court, indeed, explained that “arising under” means precisely the same thing under
§ 1331 and § 1338. 486 U.S. at 808–09.
215. See Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1983) (“Against this background, it is clear that a
suit by state tax authorities under a statute like § 18818 does not “arise under” ERISA. Unlike the
contract rights at issue in Avco, the State’s right to enforce its tax levies is not of central concern to
the federal statute. For that reason, as in Gully, on the face of a well-pleaded complaint there are
many reasons completely unrelated to the provisions and purposes of ERISA why the State may or
may not be entitled to the relief it seeks. Furthermore, ERISA does not provide an alternative cause
of action in favor of the State to enforce its rights, while § 301 expressly supplied the plaintiff in
Avco with a federal cause of action to replace its preempted state contract claim. Therefore, even
though the Court of Appeals may well be correct that ERISA precludes enforcement of the State’s
levy in the circumstances of this case, an action to enforce the levy is not itself preempted by
ERISA.”) (citation omitted).
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principle of reasoned elaboration.
The combination of Franchise Tax Board, Merrell Dow, and
Christianson fragmented the jurisdictional inquiry and abandoned the
principled approach endorsed in Gully and its predecessors. In so doing,
the Court made it increasingly difficult to honor the institutional
authority of Congress to vest federal courts with general arising-under
jurisdiction.
In deciding these cases, the Court had clearly strayed from the path
set by Gully. Practicality and necessity, speculation about an ersatz
congressional intent, and mechanical tests had come to replace the
fundamental inquiry into the federal nature of the plaintiff’s claim. In
this sense, the Court’s emerging jurisprudence sacrificed the interest of
the individual in service of the interest of the federal judicial system. At
the same time, the Court was slowly developing a doctrine that would
give federal judges a potential veto over cases that would otherwise have
fallen within their arising-under jurisdiction.
Merrell Dow, in addition to abandoning Gully, generated a major
conflict among the lower federal courts. Circuit courts split on the
critical question of whether federal courts could exercise federal
jurisdiction on state-law claims that include an essential federal
ingredient in the absence of an express or implied right of action to
enforce the federal standard. 216 The Court finally granted certiorari in
Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing 217 in an effort to resolve this conflict.218
D.

Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering &
Manufacturing

In Grable, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) seized real property
owned by Grable to satisfy Grable’s federal tax delinquency. 219 The IRS
gave Grable notice of the seizure by certified mail and Grable received
216. Compare Flood v. Braaten, 727 F.2d 303, 304–05 (3d Cir. 1984) (finding arising-under
jurisdiction under the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act despite absence of private right of action),
Hickey v. Baxter, 800 F.2d 430, 431 (4th Cir. 1986) (accord), McDougald v. Jenson, 786 F.2d 1465,
1477 (11th Cir. 1986), (accord), and Heartfield v. Heartfield, 749 F.2d 1138, 1140–41 (5th Cir.
1985) (accord), with Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 694–96 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (arriving at the
opposite conclusion post-Merrell Dow). See also Ormet Corp. v. Ohio Power Co., 98 F.3d 799,
806–07 (4th Cir. 1996) (no private right of action required to establish federal ingredient jurisdiction
post-Merrell Dow). But see Seinfeld v. Austen, 39 F.3d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1994) (private right of
action required to establish federal ingredient jurisdiction post-Merrell Dow).
217. 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
218. Id. at 311–12 & n.2.
219. Id. at 310.
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actual notice. 220 After the property was sold to Darue, Grable did not
exercise its statutory right to redeem it. 221 Five years later, Grable sued
Darue in a quiet title action in a state court claiming that Darue’s title
“was invalid because the IRS had failed to notify Grable of its seizure of
the property in the exact manner required by [26 U.S.C.] § 6335(a).” 222
That section provided that written notice had to be “given by the
Secretary to the owner of the property . . . [or] left at his usual place of
abode or business.” 223 The defendant removed the case to federal court
asserting jurisdiction under § 1331 since the quiet-title claim depended
on the interpretation and application of the federal notice statute. 224 The
district court denied Grable’s motion to remand and a judgment was
entered for Darue, the court having concluded that the notice given to
Grable was in “substantial compliance” with § 6335(a). 225 The court of
appeals affirmed. 226
The question presented to the Supreme Court was whether the statecreated quiet title claim contained a federal ingredient sufficient to
justify the exercise of federal question jurisdiction. 227 The Court
explained that the mere presence of a federal ingredient in a state law
claim is not itself sufficient to satisfy the statutory “arising-under”
standard. 228 Rather, “the question is, does a state-law claim necessarily
raise a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial, which a
federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congressionally
approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities.” 229
In adopting this four-part test, the Court also made it clear that
Merrell Dow was not to be read as requiring a private right of action in
order to establish “arising under” jurisdiction. 230 While it thus aligned
itself with the lower courts that had similarly held, the Grable Court did
not return to Gully’s durable principle. Instead, it remained focused on
220. Id.
221. Id. at 310–311.
222. Id. at 311.
223. 26 U.S.C. § 6335(a) (2000).
224. Grable, 545 U.S. at 311.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 310–11.
228. Id. at 313.
229. Id. at 314.
230. In the Court’s words, “[a]ccordingly, Merrell Dow should be read in its entirety as treating
the absence of a federal private right of action as evidence relevant to, but not dispositive of, the
‘sensitive judgments about congressional intent’ that § 1331 requires.” Id. at 318 (quoting Merrell
Dow Pharms. Inc., v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 810 (1986)).
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the details of a doctrine that seems designed to serve the federal
judiciary’s interest at the expense of the legitimate interests of individual
claimants in choosing a federal forum.
Applying its four-part test to the case before it, the Court found that
Grable’s claim was one arising under federal law. First, the adequacy of
notice under the terms of a federal statute was an essential element of the
plaintiff’s claim. 231 Second, the meaning of the federal statute was
actually disputed between the parties. 232 Third, the issue was substantial
due to the federal government’s interests in the collection of taxes, the
marketability of the title to property sold in tax delinquency sales, and
the availability of a federal forum “to vindicate its administrative
action.” 233 Finally, the Court saw no threat to the congressionally
approved balance between federal and state court jurisdiction since it
would “be the rare state title case that raises a contested matter of federal
law.” 234
While Grable eliminated the conflicts caused by Merrell Dow with
respect to the role of the private right of action in the determination of
arising-under jurisdiction, it did nothing to clarify Merrell Dow’s
multiple usages of the word “substantial,” for it did precisely the same
thing—varying the meaning of substantial between important to the
pending litigation, 235 and important in a way that transcended that
litigation. 236 In addition, the Grable Court endorsed and amplified the
policy-driven approach introduced by the Court in Franchise Tax Board,
and thus made the potential veto into an integral component of the
arising-under analysis. 237 This component, which ostensibly focuses on
the presumed intent of a silent Congress, cannot be measured other than
through a collective assessment of the ad hoc judgment of the courts that
apply it.
The inconsistency between the Grable approach, on the one hand, and
the classic and modified legal process method on the other, is palpable.
The veto principle is neither durable nor of general application, as it
calls for ad hoc determinations while providing no guidance as to how
those determinations should be made. It is also inconsistent with the
separation of powers principle since it allows courts to ignore the actual
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 310, 312.
Id. at 315.
See id. at 313–14.
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intent of Congress.
E.

Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh

The arising-under saga continued in Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh, 238 where a private healthcare provider for federal
employees brought an action against a former enrollee’s estate, seeking
reimbursement of insurance benefits on the ground that the enrollee had
recovered damages for his injuries in a state-court tort action. 239 The
question presented was whether the action for reimbursement arose
under federal law for purposes of § 1331. 240 The plan itself was subject
to the Federal Employees Health Benefits Act of 1959 (FEHBA) and
was a product of negotiations with a federal agency. 241 However, neither
FEHBA nor any federal regulation addressed the question of
reimbursement, nor was there any dispute as to the interpretation of any
federal statute or rule on which the healthcare provider’s contractually
based reimbursement claim depended. 242 Nonetheless, the suit was filed
in federal court invoking § 1331 jurisdiction. 243 The district court
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and the Second Circuit affirmed. 244
The Supreme Court likewise affirmed. 245 It first held that neither
federal common law 246 nor FEHBA created a cause of action for
reimbursement. 247 Indeed, the Court’s discussion of these questions
strongly suggested that the plaintiff’s reimbursement claim presented no
federal issue whatsoever. 248 Nonetheless, the Court proceeded (or
purported) to apply Grable’s four-part test, 249 premised on the caveat
that it designed this test to reach only a “special and small category” of
cases. 250
238. 547 U.S. 677 (2006).
239. Id. at 682–83.
240. Id. at 683.
241. Id. at 683–84.
242. Id. at 683.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 688.
245. Id. at 701.
246. Id. at 691–93.
247. Id. at 693–99.
248. See id. at 690–99 (strongly suggesting that neither federal common law nor FEHBA were in
any manner implicated by plaintiff’s claim).
249. See supra text accompanying note 229.
250. McVeigh, 547 U.S. at 699.
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The Court did not address the first or second prongs of the Grable
test, which is to say that the Court neither identified a federal ingredient
embedded in plaintiff’s reimbursement claim nor described any dispute
over the meaning, application or validity of any such ingredient. Instead,
the Court began by observing that the case before it was “poles apart
from Grable.“ 251 There were, in the Court’s view, two key distinctions.
First, because the dispute in Grable “centered on the action of a federal
agency (IRS) and its compatibility with a federal statute, the question
qualified as ‘substantial’ . . . .” 252 By way of contrast, plaintiff’s
“reimbursement claim was triggered, not by the action of any federal
department, agency, or service, but by the settlement of a personal-injury
action launched in state court . . . .” 253 Second, “Grable presented a
nearly ‘pure issue of law,’ one ‘that could be settled once and for all and
thereafter would govern numerous tax sale cases.’” 254 By way of
contrast, “Empire’s reimbursement claim . . . [was] fact-bound and
situation-specific.” 255 Given these distinctions, the Court concluded that
the case did not arise under federal law. 256
The approach adopted by the Empire Court raises three distinct
problems. First, as a general matter, the Empire Court’s treatment of the
specific facts of Grable as suggesting additional doctrinal limitations on
the scope of federal-ingredient jurisdiction misperceives the role of the
facts in the development of the law and confuses the particular
application of a rule with the rule itself. Certainly, the absence of a
federal agency in the background of the case has no necessary bearing
on the substantiality of the federal issue presented. Second, given that
the category of federal question cases is inherently “special and
small,” 257 the inclusion of that phrase suggests another unprincipled
contraction of the federal-ingredient category further disserving the
intent of Congress. On what principled ground, and by whose authority,
must that category be small? Finally, the distinction drawn by the Court
between pure questions of law and questions of fact fails to recognize
the important role of federal courts as finders of fact in vindicating
federal rights and obligations. As the Court had previously observed in
251.
252.
253.
254.

Id. at 700.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65 (Supp. 2005)).
255. Id. at 700–01.
256. Id. at 701.
257. Id. at 699.
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England v. Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 258 fact-finding
is a critical component of a federal district court’s exercise of federal
question jurisdiction:
Limiting the litigant to review here would deny him the benefit
of a federal trial court’s role in constructing a record and making
fact findings. How the facts are found will often dictate the
decision of federal claims. It is the typical, not the rare, case in
which constitutional claims turn upon the resolution of contested
factual issues. There is always in litigation a margin of error,
representing error in fact-finding.” 259
It is also fair to say that Empire failed to satisfy the reasoned elaboration
principle in that the Court’s discussion has virtually nothing to do with
resolving the federal question before it. The discussion wanders into
arising-under law when no such journey was required by the claims
presented to it. Instead, all that the Court had to do was rule that no
federal question was presented in the case, or on that basis dismiss the
petition on the ground that certiorari was improvidently granted.
F.

Grable and Empire in the Lower Federal Courts

In the wake of Grable and Empire, lower federal courts have
struggled to develop a coherent approach to what they perceive as the
mandate of the Grable/Empire test. 260 At least one circuit has created its
own multi-factor test as a method of navigating the Grable/Empire
standard. 261 Others have attempted to avoid the full implications of that
258. 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
259. Id. at 416–17 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Osborn v. Bank of
the U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 821–23 (1824) (“A cause may depend on several questions of fact and
law. . . . [I]f the circumstance that other points are involved in it, shall disable Congress from
authorizing the Courts of the Union to take jurisdiction of the original cause, it equally disables
Congress from authorizing those Courts to take jurisdiction of the whole cause, on an appeal, and
thus will be restricted to a single question in that cause; and words obviously intended to secure to
those who claim rights under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, a trial in the
federal Courts, will be restricted to the insecure remedy of an appeal upon an insulated point, after it
has received that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal, into which he is forced against
his will.”); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement That a Case Arise “Directly”
Under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV., 890, 892–93 (1967); Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal
“Question” in the District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 157, 170–72 (1953).
260. For a rare case in which all of the Grable and Empire factors seem to have been satisfied,
see Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160 (10th Cir. 2012).
261. Thus, in Mikulski v. Centerior Energy Corp., 501 F.3d 555 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc), cert.
denied, 553 U.S. 1031 (2008), the court adopted a four-part test to measure the Grable substantiality
prong: (1) whether the case includes a federal agency, and particularly, whether that agency’s
compliance with the federal statute is in dispute; (2) whether the federal question is important (i.e.,
not trivial); (3) whether a decision on the federal question will resolve the case (i.e., the federal
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standard by compressing the Grable four-part test into something that
resembles the Gully standard. 262 In essence, lower courts are creating
tests to measure the Grable/Empire test.
The variable approach to Grable’s substantiality prong is particularly
telling. Although the Grable Court focused much of its substantiality
analysis on whether the federal issue was dear to the federal system,
lower federal courts have not approached this issue uniformly. Some
have followed Grable strictly, completely ignoring the importance of the
role of the federal issue in the pending litigation.263 Others continue to
consider the significance of the federal issue to the pending litigation,264
and some also attend to the independent importance (or unimportance)
of the federal issue presented. 265 In addition, some courts consider the
absence of a federal agency in the case as being a significant limiting
factor on the question of substantiality. 266 Others require that the federal
issue present an almost pure question of law, implicitly discarding the
important fact-finding role of federal courts. 267 Similarly, some lower
courts have demanded that resolution of the federal issue be applicable
to a broad range of future cases.268 In addition, several lower courts have
enforced the alternative-theory principle elaborated in Christianson, 269
while others have advised that “jurisdiction is disfavored for cases

question is not merely incidental to the outcome); and (4) whether a decision as to the federal
question will control numerous other cases (i.e., the issue is not anomalous or isolated). Id. at 570.
262. See Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281, 1284–86 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Air Measurement Techs., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P., 504 F.3d 1262,
1271–73 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
263. E.g., McCormick v. Excel Corp., 413 F. Supp. 2d 967, 969–70 (E.D. Wis. 2006).
264. E.g., N.Y.C. Health & Hosps. Corp. v. WellCare of N.Y., Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 250, 257
(S.D.N.Y. 2001).
265. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284–86; Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1271–73; Dixon v.
Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 818 (4th Cir. 2004); Bowdrie v. Sun Pharm. Indus. Ltd., 909 F.
Supp. 2d 179, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 2012); West Virginia ex rel. McGraw v. Eli Lilly & Co., 476 F. Supp.
2d 230, 233–34 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Beechwood Dev. Grp., Inc. v. Konersman, 517 F. Supp. 2d 770,
775 (D.S.C. 2007).
266. Gilmore v. Weatherford, 694 F.3d 1160, 1174 (10th Cir. 2012).
267. Id.; Bender v. Jordan, 623 F.3d 1128, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Alade v. Barnes-Jewish Hosp.,
Inc., No. 4:12-CV-497 CAS, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Yellen v. Teledne Cont’l
Motors, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 2d 490, 497–98 (E.D. Pa. 2011); McAdams v. Medtronic, Inc., No. H10-831, 2010 WL 3909958, at *2–4 (S.D. Tex. 2010).
268. Alade, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4; Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 497–98; McAdams, 2010 WL
3909958, at *3–4; Alcarmen v. Citibank N.A., No. C–09–0853 EMC, 2009 WL 1330803, at *3
(N.D. Cal. 2009).
269. Whittington v. Morgan Stanley Smith Barney, No. 1:12CV112, 2012 WL 4846484, at *4
(W.D.N.C. 2012); In re Oxycontin Antitrust Litig., 821 F. Supp. 2d 591, 599 (S.D.N.Y. 2011);
Blakenship v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 2d 886, 898 (C.D. Ill. 2006).
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that . . . involve substantial questions of state as well as federal law.” 270
Finally, some lower courts have treated Empire’s admonition that cases
satisfying the Grable standard should represent a “special and small
category” as creating an additional presumption against the exercise of
federal question jurisdiction. 271 Taking all of these approaches together,
and considering their inherent malleability, the law of federal question
jurisdiction has become anything but principled and seemingly rests
within the hands of each individual federal court judge.
In short, Gully’s elegant compass, with its point pinned on the “true
north” of congressional intent and the role played by the federal issue in
the claim presented, has been replaced by a maze of multi-pronged tests
that mask the essential inquiry with the rhetoric of policy, pragmatics,
ersatz intent, speculation, and ever-expanding multi-prong tests.
IV. GUNN V. MINTON: A CASE STUDY
We now come to Gunn v. Minton,272 the Supreme Court’s latest foray
into the thicket of arising-under jurisdiction. At the very least, Gunn
provided the Court an opportunity to clarify the confusion generated by
its most recent federal-ingredient decisions; at its very best, Gunn
offered the Court an opportunity to return jurisdictional analysis to its
principled roots. The Court chose a different path.
Vernon Minton filed a federal patent infringement action (the “Patent
Litigation”) against the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(the “NASD”), assisted by attorney Jerry W. Gunn and other lawyers.273
Minton alleged that the NASD had infringed his U.S. patent for
TEXCEN, a telecommunications network and software program. 274
Minton’s company had leased TEXCEN to R.M. Stark & Co. (“Stark”)
more than one year before he applied for the patent for that invention.275
At the time of the lease, Minton assured Stark that TEXCEN was a
finished product and never suggested that the purpose of the lease was
270. E.g., Bender 623 F.3d at 1130.
271. Gilmore, 694 F.3d at 1171; Alade, 2012 WL 2598091, at *4; Yellen, 832 F. Supp. 2d at 497;
Baum v. Keystone Mercy Health Plan, 826 F. Supp. 2d 718, 720 (E.D. Pa. 2011); McAdams, 2010
WL 3909958, at *2; J. Kaz, Inc. v. Brown, No. 10-0382, 2010 WL 2024483, at *3 (W.D. Pa. 2010);
In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg. Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 2008 WL 5450351, at *4 (S.D.
Cal. 2008).
272. __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013).
273. Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 3, Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013) (No.
11-1118).
274. Id. at 3–4.
275. Id. at 4.
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experimentation. 276 NASD moved for summary judgment arguing that
the technology that formed the basis of Minton’s patent had been the
subject of a commercial lease—the lease to Stark—more than a year
before Minton applied for the patent. 277 According to NASD, the “on
sale bar” would thus apply and preclude Minton from acquiring a patent
on the technology. 278 The district court granted NASD’s summary
judgment motion. 279 Minton’s attorneys then filed a motion for
reconsideration, raising the new argument that the “experimental use”
negated the “on sale bar.” 280 The district court, however, denied
reconsideration. 281 Minton appealed and the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment. 282
Minton then filed a legal malpractice suit before a Texas state court
against Gunn and the attorneys who represented Minton in the Patent
Litigation. 283 He alleged that, by failing to raise the experimental use
doctrine in a timely fashion, his lawyers had been negligent and caused
him to lose the case. 284 The lawyer defendants filed motions for
summary judgment, challenging the causation element of Minton’s
malpractice claim. 285 They argued that the experimental use exception
did not apply to the commercial lease at issue and that their alleged
failure to timely plead and brief the exception therefore could not have
caused Minton any harm. 286 The trial court granted the defendants’
summary judgment motions and entered a take-nothing judgment on all
Minton’s claims. 287 Minton appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Second District of Texas. 288 While that appeal was pending, the Federal
Circuit decided Air Measurement Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld, L.L.P. 289 and Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright &

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5–6.
Id. at 6.
Id.
504 F.3d 1262 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Jaworski, LLP, 290 each of which addressed the precise question
presented in Gunn v. Minton.
In Air Measurement, the question was whether a state-created legal
malpractice case for negligent representation in a previous patent
prosecution and litigation could be removed to federal court as a suit
arising under the patent laws within the meaning of § 1338. 291 The
Federal Circuit relied on the Grable test and held that removal was
proper. 292 First, the court found that the patent law issue was embedded
in the malpractice claim since proof of patent infringement was a
necessary element of the plaintiff’s malpractice claim. 293 Next, since the
parties disagreed on the question of patent infringement, the court easily
concluded that the infringement question was actually disputed. 294 Third,
the court concluded that the patent infringement question was
substantial, citing three reasons—because it was “a necessary element of
the malpractice case,” 295 “because patents are issued by a federal
agency,” 296 and because litigants will benefit “from federal judges who
have experience in claim construction and infringement matters.” 297
Finally, as to the last Grable prong, the court found that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be consistent with the congressionally mandated
balance of jurisdiction between state and federal courts, explaining,
“Congress considered the federal-state division of labor and struck a
balance in favor of this court’s entertaining patent infringement. For us
to conclude otherwise would undermine Congress’s expectation.” 298
The Immunocept case, 299 decided by the Federal Circuit on the same
day as Air Measurement, involved another patent-based legal
malpractice claim. The court again found arising-under jurisdiction
satisfied. 300 As was true in Air Measurement, the plaintiff’s malpractice
claim included an essential patent-law ingredient that was the subject of
an actual dispute between the parties. 301 With this as its starting point,
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1267.
Id. at 1273.
Id. at 1269.
Id. at 1272.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, 504 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1283.
Id. at 1285.
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the Immunocept court addressed the last two prongs of the Grable test
jointly. In that discussion, the court relied on three factors in concluding
that the plaintiff’s patent-law-premised malpractice claim arose under
federal law: (1) the federal issue presented in the case was important as a
matter of patent law; (2) the issue was one that called for the expertise of
federal judges from which litigants would benefit; and (3) the exercise of
jurisdiction under the circumstances was consistent with congressional
intent. 302
Air Measurement and Immunocept are almost perfect exemplars of
the classic and modified legal process method. Each is premised on
durable jurisdictional principles of general applicability, which each
court applied consistently with the full range of constitutional structure
in mind, including the right of individual claimants to seek a federal
forum under standards consistent with congressional intent. The courts’
analyses also provide a straightforward, reasoned elaboration in that the
conclusions reached logically proceed from the principled premise on
which they are based. It almost goes without saying (but I have to say
it!) that both cases are consistent with the claim-centered approach to
jurisdiction developed in Part I.B of this article and, hence, are
consistent with Gully.
In his then-pending case before the Texas Court of Appeals, Minton
now argued, based on Air Measurement and Immunocept, that his legal
malpractice action belonged to the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts. 303 The state appellate court disagreed and held that Minton’s state
law malpractice claims did not “arise under” federal law. 304 Specifically,
the Court of Appeals’ majority held that the third and fourth prongs of
the Grable test had not been satisfied. 305
In so ruling, the state court declined to follow the Federal Circuit’s
decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept, explaining that those
rulings were not binding on it. 306 The appellate court further observed
that, in its view, the Federal Circuit misapplied United States Supreme
Court precedent by disregarding the “federalism” component of the
Grable test and by misapplying the substantiality requirement. 307
Minton appealed to the Texas Supreme Court. 308 The Texas high
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 1285–86.
Minton v. Gunn, 301 S.W. 3d 702, 708 (Tex. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 709.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Minton v. Gunn, 355 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. 2011).
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court applied the Grable test and, finding each prong of that test to have
been satisfied, held that Minton’s legal malpractice claim fell within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts. 309 The majority’s reasoning
largely tracked the decisions in Air Measurement and Immunocept. 310
Under this approach, the first two Grable prongs were easily satisfied
since Minton’s malpractice claim was dependent on a question of patent
law and since the parties disputed the application of that federal standard
under the facts presented. 311 The question of substantiality was resolved
by reference to the significant role the patent law issue played within the
context of the plaintiff’s claim. 312 Finally, with respect to the balance
between federal and state court jurisdiction, the Texas court emphasized
the strong federal interest in the uniform application of patent law. 313
On October 5, 2012, 314 the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Gunn
v. Minton on the following question:
Did the Federal Circuit depart from the standard this Court
articulated in Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue
Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005), for “arising under”
jurisdiction of the federal courts under 28 U.S.C. § 1338, when
it held that state law legal malpractice claims against trial
lawyers for their handling of underlying patent matters come
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts? Because
the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over appeals
involving patents, are state courts and federal courts strictly
following the Federal Circuit’s mistaken standard, thereby
magnifying its jurisdictional error and sweeping broad swaths of
state law claims - which involve no actual patents and have no
impact on actual patent rights - into the federal courts? 315
Thus, the issue presented in Gunn was whether a state-based
malpractice claim that requires the resolution of a federal patent law
question arises under federal law for purposes of § 1338.
Before we analyze the Supreme Court’s decision in that case, we will
address the issue under the standards established by Gully and through
the lens of the proposed modified legal process model.
309. Id. at 642–47.
310. See id.
311. Id. at 642–43.
312. Id. at 643.
313. Id. at 644–46.
314. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 420 (2012) (granting certiorari).
315. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (No. 111118) (filed Mar. 9, 2012).
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GUNN THROUGH THE UNIFIED CLAIM-CENTERED
APPROACH

When deciding whether a case arises under federal law, the essential
question should be whether the plaintiff’s claim depends on the
construction, validity, or effect of federal law. 316 Resolving this question
does not require the application of any multi-pronged or mechanical test.
Nor does this question require a distinction between causes of action
created by federal law and state causes of action that include an essential
federal ingredient. In both circumstances, the relevant litigation unit is
the claim. Hence, the jurisdictional analysis requires nothing more than a
careful assessment of the claim and a sound judgment as to the role that
the federal question plays in the resolution of that claim. It would be
difficult to improve on Justice Cardozo’s earlier quoted admonition in
Gully:
What is needed is something of that common-sense
accommodation of judgment to kaleidoscopic situations which
characterizes the law in its treatment of problems of causation.
One could carry the search for causes backward, almost without
end. Instead, there has been a selective process which picks the
substantial causes out of the web and lays the other ones aside.
As in problems of causation, so here in the search for the
underlying law. If we follow the ascent far enough, countless
claims of right can be discovered to have their source or their
operative limits in the provisions of a federal statute or in the
Constitution itself with its circumambient restrictions upon
legislative power. To set bounds to the pursuit, the courts have
formulated the distinction between controversies that are basic
and those that are collateral, between disputes that are necessary
and those that are merely possible. We shall be lost in a maze if
we put that compass by. 317
The only policy reflected in Justice Cardozo’s analysis is one of
careful judgment in determining whether the role played by the federal
question in the claim is sufficiently important to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction. Thus, the entire analysis focuses on a durable principle, and
no mechanical test or formula can improve on that. Rather, as indicated
by Justice Cardozo, a mechanical approach carries the risk of creating
doctrinal labyrinths from which there is no exit.
316. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908); Tennessee v. Union &
Planters’ Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
317. Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299 U.S. 109, 117–18 (1936) (citations omitted).

07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

10/10/2013 5:11 PM

1010

[Vol. 88:961

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

One could argue that the approach offered by Justice Cardozo in
Gully is too broad and too vague, and that the tests and the doctrinal
formulas later endorsed by the Supreme Court in cases such as
Franchise Tax Board, Merell Dow, Christianson, Grable, and Empire
were necessary to give content and contour to the general principles and
foundations identified in Gully. Yet, history belies this. Decades before
Gully, the Court had established that the focus of the arising-under
jurisdictional analysis was on the plaintiff’s claim and on the federal
question substantially involved in that claim. There had been no
indication that this formula was not working or that it had caused a flood
of litigation in the federal courts. As explained in Shulthis, 318 if the
plaintiff’s claim depended on the “validity, construction, or effect” of
federal law, 319 that claim gave rise to a true controversy on federal law
which, as such, deserved a federal forum. 320 The standard may have been
simple, but it was not vague.
Any additional inquiry is a distraction from these fundamental
questions and could lead to results inconsistent with the underlying
durable principle and with congressional intent. For example, to ask
simply whether federal law has created a claim is to misstate the inquiry.
The issue is not one of creation or of the source of the right being sued
upon, but rather pertains solely to the nature of the claim. This approach
is fully consistent with the classic and modified legal process model. It
reflects the entire range of structural considerations that ought to be
included in a legal process methodology. It renders to federal courts that
which is truly federal in nature (federalism and supremacy), it respects
the judgment of Congress (separation of powers), and it measures the
scope of jurisdiction from the perspective of the individual’s claim of
right (individual rights).
Likewise, to speak in terms of an essential federal ingredient adds an
additional layer of complexity to the analysis by suggesting that a
different line of inquiry is needed to assess the availability of federal
question jurisdiction in that particular context.
Highly specific tests and rules are sometimes used by legal systems to
achieve impartiality and certainty in the administration of justice.
Moreover, the application of mechanical tests is easier than going
beneath the form to substance of the matter. 321 Today, however, legal
318. Shulthis v. McDougal, 225 U.S. 561 (1912).
319. Id. at 570.
320. Id.
321. Roscoe Pound, The Administrative Application of Legal Standards, 42 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
445, 452–53 (1919).
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systems have become too complex to be managed by narrow rules and
tests and “[i]t is . . . in the maturity of law that men acquire confidence
in reasoning as an infallible, impersonal instrument, quite as reliable as
mechanical forms and much superior in its results.” 322 This more flexible
method of legal analysis is more successful than one that proceeds
through narrow rules and tests, “[f]or human interests will assert
themselves continually in new ways and significant institutions of everyday life often arise extra-legally and produce their most important results
independent of or even against the law.” 323
Thus, the proper question to guide the arising-under analysis is simply
whether the plaintiff’s claim truly involves the construction, validity, or
effect of federal law. Certainly this is the approach that was applied in
Smith, 324 and the one that was endorsed in Justice Frankfurter’s oftquoted description of federal question jurisdiction:
Almost without exception, decisions under the general statutory
grants have tested jurisdiction in terms of the presence, as an
integral part of plaintiff’s cause of action, of an issue calling for
interpretation or application of federal law. E.g., Gully v. First
National Bank, 299 U.S. 109. Although it has sometimes been
suggested that the “cause of action” must derive from federal
law, see American Well Works Co. v. Layne and Bowler Co.,
241 U.S. 257, it has been found sufficient that some aspect of
federal law is essential to plaintiff’s success. Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180. The litigation-provoking
problem has been the degree to which federal law must be in the
forefront of the case and not collateral, peripheral or remote. 325
Once it is established that the plaintiff’s claim requires the
determination of a federal question, the natural consequence should be
that that a federal court may address that question. True, federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. However, they were created in part to
ensure uniformity in the interpretation and application of federal law.
Any artificial limitation on the access to federal courts undermines that
purpose. Also, if a non-frivolous federal question appears in the case,
exercising arising-under jurisdiction over that question cannot, by
definition, upset the congressionally mandated balance between federal
and state courts in the absence of an express congressional direction to
322. Id. at 453.
323. Id.
324. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
325. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)
(parallel citations omitted).
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the contrary. Whether the exercise of federal question jurisdiction upsets
the congressionally mandated balance is a question for Congress
ultimately to decide, and Congress is fully capable of doing that. Indeed,
one wonders how a court can ever know whether some exercise of
federal question jurisdiction would upset that balance other than through
sheer speculation. Moreover, it is unclear on what legitimate basis a
federal court judge should have the authority to force cases involving
basic and necessary federal questions into state courts.
Thus, the way out of the maze created by the modern approach to
federal question jurisdiction is to be found in the claim-centered
approach as exemplified in Gully and not in some further elaborations of
Grable or any of the other recent jurisdictional cases. Indeed, the second,
third and fourth prongs of Grable are all suspect. As to the second, given
that the jurisdictional analysis must be carried out solely by reference to
the plaintiff’s complaint, the Grable Court’s requirement that the federal
issue be actually disputed is impossible to apply, for no actual dispute
can be assessed by reference to only one side of the controversy. Hence,
a lower federal court’s effort to determine whether a federal issue is
actually disputed in a case is misplaced and completely inconsistent with
the well-pleaded complaint rule.
The third Grable inquiry—the substantiality of the federal issue—is
redundant. Establishing the existence of a true and colorable controversy
on the construction, validity, or effect of federal law should create the
strongest possible presumption in favor of federal jurisdiction. No
independent inquiry into substantiality need be required. In fact, learning
from the struggles, and the diverging approaches, of the lower courts,
and from Gully and Smith, a federal issue should be considered
“substantial” if it is meaningful within the context of the litigation, i.e.,
colorable and essential within that proceeding. And, certainly, if a
federal question plays an important role in the case, the strongest
presumption should be that there is a federal forum available to hear that
claim. Thus, the last Grable inquiry—the possible veto—is illegitimate.
In fact, in light of the strong presumption in favor of jurisdiction when a
federal question is truly presented, only a clear signal from Congress to
the contrary should provide a sufficient rebuttal.
The answer to the issue presented by Gunn should now be easy. In
Gunn, the malpractice litigation was truly about patent law. If it were
concluded that Minton’s lawyers improperly failed to raise the
experimental use exception in the Patent Litigation, Minton would
prevail on his legal malpractice claim. To make that determination, it
would be necessary to interpret and apply the standards of patent law to
the facts relevant to Minton’s malpractice claim. Thus, the controversy
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over the federal issue is neither collateral nor merely possible. Rather,
the controversy over the proper interpretation and application of the
experimental use exception is basic and necessary to the resolution of
Minton’s claim. This is a quintessential question for federal courts.
Having established this proposition, any additional analysis required by
Grable would be either redundant or illegitimate. Moreover, any
contrary conclusion on the jurisdictional issue would simply be wrong
because Congress has in no way suggested that jurisdiction should be
unavailable for the adjudication of such federal issues. Quite the
opposite: by giving exclusive federal question jurisdiction over patent
law claims and patent law counterclaims, 326 Congress has expressed a
clear mandate that patent law issues should be welcomed by, and
adjudicated in, federal courts and only in federal courts. 327
The Gunn Court arrived at a different conclusion, not under a
different interpretation of Gully, but under an approach that draws a
bright-line distinction between causes of action created by federal law
and state law claims containing an essential federal ingredient. This
approach essentially ignores Gully and turns a blind eye to congressional
intent in an apparent effort to reduce the federal courts’ caseload.
VI. THE SUPREME COURT’S MECHANICAL SOLUTION IN
GUNN
The Gunn Court began its analysis by admitting that its arising-under
jurisprudence had come to resemble a “Jackson Pollock” canvas. 328
However, as the Court explained, Grable was designed to “bring some
order to this unruly doctrine,” 329 and, in the Court’s view, resolution of
the issue in Gunn required nothing more than a straightforward
application of the four-prong Grable test—a myopic paint-by-numbers
approach to jurisdiction under which a judge may never look at, much
less consider, the picture as a whole.
In applying that test, the Court acknowledged that the “resolution of
326. See the “Holmes Group fix,” contained in Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 19, 125 Stat. 284, 331
(2011) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006 & Supp. V 2007–2012)).
327. Id. Apropos to that mandate, leaving disputes over federal law such as that presented in
Gunn to state courts would pose the risk of inconsistent interpretations and applications of a body of
law that Congress wanted exclusively decided by federal courts. Patent lawyers would have to be
aware of the federal interpretation of patent law and of individual state courts’ interpretation of that
law under which they could be subject to malpractice. This complexity would certainly have an
impact on the litigation of patent issues in federal courts.
328. Gunn v. Minton, __U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1065 (2013).
329. Id.
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[a] federal patent question [was] ‘necessary’ to Minton’s case” 330 and
that the patent-law issue was “the central point of dispute.” 331 The third
and fourth prongs of the Grable test, however, proved fatal to Minton’s
quest for exclusive federal jurisdiction. 332
On the question of substantiality, the Court admonished the Supreme
Court of Texas for focusing “on the importance of the issue to the
plaintiff’s case and to the parties before it.” 333 The Court explained,
“The substantiality inquiry under Grable looks instead to the importance
of the issue to the federal system as a whole.” 334 The Court followed up
on this observation by explaining that in Grable the “Federal
Government” had a “strong interest” in the resolution of the federal issue
there presented. 335 Hence, the exercise of jurisdiction there was in order.
The Gunn Court’s treatment of substantiality was particularly
troubling. First, the artificial distinction between cases satisfying the
creation test and cases satisfying the essential federal ingredient test is a
relatively recent phenomenon, traceable largely to Merrell Dow.
Certainly, the Court in Smith did not create a novel jurisdictional
doctrine. 336 Prior to Merrell Dow, the decision in Gully had fully
captured a unified arising-under theory. That theory focused on the
importance of the federal issue to the plaintiff’s claim, an approach that
seemed completely consistent with the congressional intent to create a
federal forum for the resolution of claims premised on questions of
federal law. Also, there is no evidence that Congress wanted the courts
to adopt a narrower construction of arising-under jurisdiction in federalingredient cases. Hence, this distinction, however useful it may be in
reducing the federal courts’ caseload, is nothing more than a creature of
judicial imagination. 337
Federal courts were created by Congress and vested with federal
question jurisdiction for the benefit of litigants, not for the benefit of the
federal system or federal judges. The notion that federal question
jurisdiction should turn on the interest of the federal government or on

330. Id.
331. Id.
332. See id. at 1066–68.
333. Id. at 1066.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. See Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 82, at 2153 (essential federal ingredient cases “were
perhaps the paradigm ‘arising under’ cases” in the nineteenth century).
337. See F. Andrew Hessick III, The Common Law of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 60 ALA. L.
REV. 895, 923–25 (2009).
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the interest of the federal system (whatever that may mean), or in federal
judges’ perception as to the burden of their caseload, is wholly
inconsistent with this principle. This notion, first introduced in 1986 in
Merrell Dow and further developed in Grable and Empire, seems to be
more in service of the judiciary’s interest in docket management than it
is faithful to congressional intent. Indeed, given that the purpose of
federal question jurisdiction is to serve litigants who assert claims
premised on federal law, this newly created principle flies in the face of
congressional intent and the structural principles of separation of powers
and the protection of individual claims of right. 338
The Supreme Court is of course free to change doctrine. As I
previously noted, courts retain an important role in statesmanship. But
nothing in the Court’s recent federal-question jurisprudence suggests
that its abandonment of both Gully’s durable principle and a claimcentered approach to jurisdiction is a product of statesmanship. Rather,
given the workability of the established principles, the exercise of
jurisdiction would seem to call for an exercise of judicial craftsmanship,
a skill that is sorely lacking in the Court’s recent federal-question
jurisprudence.
The Gunn Court also thought that the federal issue presented there
was not substantial because it was “posed in a merely hypothetical
sense: If Minton’s lawyers had raised a timely experimental-use
argument, would the result in the patent infringement proceeding have
been different?” 339 It is true that the resolution of this question would not
have altered the judgment already rendered in the patent litigation.
However, this “hypothetical” issue was, as the Court noted, essential to
Minton’s claim and, if he prevailed on it, he would be entitled to
significant monetary damages from his former attorneys. 340 In addition,
this hypothetical patent law decision, if resolved by the state courts,
would necessarily have an effect on patent law attorneys practicing in
that state, for they would have to adjust their patent litigation practices to
the patent law interpretations rendered by the courts of the state in which
they practice. One might think that this collateral consequence would be
of interest to the “federal system,” but the Court offers no elaboration,
338. Congress has consistently indicated its intent to open the doors of federal courts to a wide
range of federal question cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2006) (extending patent arising under
jurisdiction to patent law counterclaims); id. § 1367(a) (broad supplemental jurisdiction over claims
and parties in federal question cases); id. § 1441(c) (removal of federal question cases that have
been joined with otherwise non-removable claims); id. § 1454 (authorizing removal of actions in
which any party asserts a claim for relief arising under patent or copyright law).
339. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067.
340. Id. at 1067–68.
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reasoned or otherwise, of why it did not matter.
The Court, borrowing from Empire and measuring the case before it
against a mechanical test rather than a durable principle, also noted that
“[t]he present case is ‘poles apart from Grable,’ in which . . . resolution
of the federal question ‘would be controlling in numerous other
cases.’” 341 This is a curious observation, since the federal issue in
Grable was not important enough for the Supreme Court to review on
certiorari. Instead, the Supreme Court left that question to the lower
courts. One also wonders how a federal district court, measuring arisingunder jurisdiction from the perspective of the plaintiff’s complaint, could
possibly determine whether the federal issue presented is going to be
controlling in numerous other cases. Certainly, the Court has offered no
workable method through which a federal court can assess this impact
other than by looking at the court’s own caseload which often will not
fully reflect the importance of an issue on a national basis.
The Court also observed that the “fact-bound and situation-specific”
nature of the federal issue weighted against the exercise of federal
question jurisdiction. 342 However, as the Court noted in Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 343 “[a] cause may depend on several questions of
fact and law.” 344 Thus, the Gunn Court’s narrow view of the role of
federal court jurisdiction as one pertaining only to the interpretation of
law, overlooks the important fact-finding role of federal trial courts 345
and again fails to account for a federal court’s role in providing a federal
forum for the vindication of individual claims of right.
Finally, the Court’s treatment of the fourth Grable prong was
peculiar. The Court suggested that because the third prong was not
satisfied, the fourth was not either, essentially rendering the fourth prong
meaningless. 346 The Court did observe, however, that the states have a
special interest in policing members of “licensed professions.” 347 As to
the legal profession, the Court noted that the states’ “interest . . . in
regulating lawyers is especially great since lawyers are essential to the
primary governmental function of administering justice, and have

341. Id. at 1067 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700
(2006)).
342. Id. at 1068.
343. 22 U.S. 738 (1824).
344. Id. at 821.
345. See supra text accompanying note 259.
346. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1068.
347. Id.

07 - Grossi Article.docx (Do Not Delete)

2013]

ARISING-UNDER JURISDICTION

10/10/2013 5:11 PM

1017

historically been officers of the courts.” 348
Yet the Court did not explain why a state would have a paramount
interest in ensuring the competence of lawyers litigating patent law
issues in federal courts. Nor did the Court consider the countervailing
federal interest in the competence of those lawyers, who are, after all,
members of the federal bar. The Court’s reasoning here is illogical in
that a state’s general interest in regulating the practice of law does not
establish a specific interest in regulating the practice of law in federal
courts exercising exclusive federal jurisdiction. Also, the Court fell into
the trap of treating federalism as a narrow concept reflecting only the
“states’ rights” side of the equation. Hence, the opinion on this point
runs afoul of the principles of structural interpretation and reasoned
elaboration.
*****
As it stands right now, after the decision in Gunn, the essential federal
ingredient test requires (at a minimum) four elements: (1) an essential
federal ingredient embedded in a state law claim, that is (2) actually
disputed, (3) substantial—i.e., (i) an issue of law, (ii) important to the
federal system, and (iii) controlling numerous other cases—and (4) such
that assigning it to federal courts would not distort the appropriate
balance of federal and state judicial responsibilities as envisioned by the
courts. In addition to the above, however, one must also take into
account the other factors that the lower courts continue to apply.
Under the standards established in Gunn, it will be a very rare federalingredient case indeed that qualifies for statutory arising-under
jurisdiction. To put it differently, it would be very easy for a busy
federal judge to apply Gunn to find jurisdiction lacking. Yet, if a case
truly presents a federal issue that is at the forefront of a state-created
claim, it should be the exceptional circumstance under which jurisdiction
is denied.
As Justice Brennan observed in his Merrell Dow dissent:
Congress passes laws in order to shape behavior; a federal law
expresses Congress’ determination that there is a federal interest
in having individuals or other entities conform their actions to a
particular norm established by that law . . . . It is the duty of
courts to interpret these laws and apply them in such a way that
the congressional purpose is realized . . . . Congress granted the
district courts power to hear cases “arising under” federal law in
order to enhance the likelihood that federal laws would be

348. Id. (quoting Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975)).
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interpreted more correctly and applied more uniformly. In other
words, Congress determined that the availability of a federal
forum to adjudicate cases involving federal questions would
make it more likely that federal laws would shape behavior in
the way that Congress intended.
By making federal law an essential element of a state-law claim,
the State places the federal law into a context where it will
operate to shape behavior: the threat of liability will force
individuals to conform their conduct to interpretations of the
federal law made by courts adjudicating the state-law claim . . . .
Consequently, the possibility that the federal law will be
incorrectly interpreted in the context of adjudicating the statelaw claim implicates the concerns that led Congress to grant the
district courts power to adjudicate cases involving federal
questions in precisely the same way as if it was federal law that
“created” the cause of action. 349
To be sure, if Congress expressly precludes the exercise of
jurisdiction, a court must conform to that express intent. There might
also be other circumstances indicating a congressional intent to limit
jurisdiction over particular federal questions, or to give courts discretion
as to whether a particular form of jurisdiction should be exercised. 350 But
whether there are such circumstances should not be dependent on an
artificial, judicially created four-part test. That artificial test allows
judges to ignore congressional intent and to reject federal jurisdiction at
the expense of allowing plaintiffs to have their federal claim heard in a
federal court.
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The current law of federal question jurisdiction is just another
example of the problems generated by the proliferation of doctrines and
tests apparently intended to provide guidance to lower courts and
perhaps cabin their discretion. However, this proliferation of doctrines
and tests ends up, as the Court itself has admitted, creating a Jackson
Pollock canvas, 351 cluttering the analysis with irrelevancies and
illegitimate considerations that stray far from the durable principles that

349. Merrell Dow Pharms. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 827–28 (1986) (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
350. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (giving federal courts discretion with respect to hearing
certain supplemental jurisdiction claims).
351. Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065.
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should instead guide the courts. The results are often confusing, rarely
helpful and frequently inconsistent with the fundamental principles that
they purport to apply.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Gunn represents the Supreme
Court’s most recent statement on the law of arising-under jurisdiction in
the context of a federal question embedded in a state-law claim. The
decision appears inconsistent with virtually all classic and modified legal
process principles. As to the principle of structural interpretation, the
Court overplays federalism by failing to take into account other
countervailing interests such as federal supremacy, actual congressional
intent, and individuals’ congressionally vested right to access a federal
forum on claims that truly raise federal issues—issues as to which a
federal court may be more expert and fairer than its state counterpart.
The Court’s decision also challenges the institutional settlement
principle by adopting what is in essence a procedural test that will lead
to ad hoc and unpredictable results. In addition, the Gunn opinion’s freestyle interpretation of federal statutes represents a type of anti-formalism
that borders on legal realism, and that allows the judicially perceived
interests of the “federal system” to trump a wider spectrum of legitimate
and constitutionally demanded interests, including the actual intent of
Congress. As Cardozo observed,
Judges have, of course, the power, though not the right, to ignore the
mandate of a statute, and render judgment in despite of it. They have the
power, though not the right, to travel beyond the walls of the interstices,
the bounds set to judicial innovation by precedent and custom. None the
less, by that abuse of power, they violate the law. 352
Gunn is also inconsistent with the rule of law principle, for it designs
a completely unpredictable and unworkable procedure that allows
federal courts to divest themselves of cases that would otherwise
sensibly fall within the scope of arising-under jurisdiction. Next, as I
have already explained, several passages of the opinion fail to satisfy
any sensible standard of reasonable elaboration. But most importantly,
the major flaw with the Gunn opinion, as with several of the Court’s
other recent procedural decisions, 353 is its mechanical, test-driven
352. CARDOZO, supra note 36, at 129.
353. For an analysis of this phenomenon in related contexts, see Grossi, Forum Non Conveniens
Reconsidered, supra note 5; Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth With No Exit,
supra note 5; Allan Ides & Simona Grossi, The Purposeful Availment Trap, 7 FED. CT. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013); Allan Ides, A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme Court’s Decision in J.
Mcintyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341 (2012); Allan Ides, The Standard
for Measuring the Validity of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure: The Shady Grove Debate between
Justices Scalia and Stevens, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1041 (2011).
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approach to doctrine that operates contrary to the valid, durable
principles and fails to provide any real guidance to lower courts and
litigants in the application of the law. This myopic test-driven approach
is not only inappropriate but it is inefficient, for it requires continuous
interventions by the Court to revisit its earlier pronouncements that have
proven themselves inadequate and theoretically ungrounded. 354
While there is clearly a need for the Court to again visit the statutory
arising-under topic, one would be naïve to believe that the next visit will
suddenly rescue certainty from this sea of confusion. In the meantime,
the level of unpredictability and unfairness will likely remain high.
While it may often be healthy that reasonable minds differ, this is not
true with respect to the standards that govern the access to the federal
courts. These standards, particularly for federal question cases, should be
clear, fair, and true to the underlying intent of Congress, rather than
subject to the unfettered discretion of courts that may be interested in
reducing their caseload.

354. An apt example of this phenomenon can be seen in the law of personal jurisdiction where
the Court seems unable to find a transcendent, theoretical principle to meaningfully guide the
analysis. Thus, on March 4, 2013, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Walden v. Fiore,
__U.S.__, 133 S. Ct. 1493 (2013), yet another case involving personal jurisdiction. See Petition for
a Writ of Certiorari at i, Walden v. Fiore, No. 12-574 (filed Nov. 6, 2012). This happened less than
two years after the Court decided two other personal jurisdiction cases, Goodyear Dunlop Tires
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2010), and J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, __U.S.__, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).

